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DIVORCE LAW, FEMINISM, AND
PSYCHOANALYSIS: IN DREAMS BEGIN
RESPONSIBILITIES*

Barbara Stark**

INTRODUCTION

The high divorce rate, like women's increased labor force participation, reflects and reinforces a sea change in sex roles and family structure. I From a feminist perspective, divorce is a particularly
In Delmore Schwartz's most famous short story:
A movie theatre becomes the site of dreams; the screen, a reflector of
old events we know will soon be turning sour. The narrator watches
father propose to mother at a Coney Island restaurant. Already, during
the delights of courtship, they become entangled in the vanities and
deceptions that will embitter their later years. But what can the audience
do about it?
Howe, Forward, in D. SCHWARTZ, IN DREAMS BEGIN RESPONSIBILITIES AND OTHER
STORIES viii (1978).
** Associate Professor, University of Tennessee; LL.M. Columbia 1989; J.D.
N.Y.U. 1976; B.A. Cornell 1973. I am most grateful to Louis Henkin and Nadine Taub
for their painstaking and thought-provoking review of earlier drafts. Their inspiration
and encouragement, and that of Carolyn Heilbrun and Subha Narasimhan, are deeply
appreciated. The criticism and suggestions of Drs. Susan Goodman, Hannah Levin and
Andrea Remez were invaluable. Jonathan Hyman's perceptive remarks on mediation in
the context of divorce and the comments of the participants in the workshop at the
interdisciplinary "Global Feminism Begins at Home" Conference (Rutgers University,
May 1989), where an early version of the paper was presented, were also helpful.
Thanks, finally, to Karin Clough and Elisabeth Donnovin for their research assistance
and enthusiasm, and to Russell Glazer for his excellent editing.
1. M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 19 (1977) (hereinafter M. GLENDON,
STATE, LAW AND FAMILY]; M. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW

2 (1990); see Jenson, Changing Discourses, Changing Agendas: PoliticalRights and Reproductive Policies in France, in WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN THE U.S. AND WESTERN
EUROPE 64, 81 (M. Katzenstein & C. Mueller eds. 1987) [hereinafter WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS]; 5 STATISTIQUE ANNUELLE/LES PROCES CIVILS 1986-1987, at 41 [hereinafter
STATISTIQUE ANNUELLE] ("La fr~quence du divorce"). See generally, C. KAPLAN,
SEA CHANGES: ESSAYS ON CULTURE AND FEMINISM 1 (1986); A. SWERDLOW, R.
BRIDENTHAL, J. KELLY & P. VINE, HOUSEHOLD AND KIN: FAMILIES IN FLUX (1989);
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intriguing rite of passage. 2 At divorce, a woman changes her relationship not only with an individual man but with a male-dominated society as well. In effect, she exchanges the intimate
experience of intrafamilial patriarchy for the social experience of
patriarchy without the buffer of wifely status.3 Divorce law may be
understood as the state's mediation of that transition. It deserves
our 4 close attention not only as an "index of social relations" 5 between the sexes, but also because it is for the most part an appalling
failure for the divorced spouses, their children, and societies in-6
creasingly comprised of those whose lives are affected by divorce.
infra note 6 (divorce rates in the United States and Europe); infra note 103 (statistics
regarding women's labor force participation). As Professor Glendon has noted, this
phenomenon is not limited to the United States. This article draws freely on French
divorce law and the work of French feminists to indicate the cross-cultural scope of its
premise. See infra text accompanying note 15; cf. L. STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, ENG-

LAND 1530-1987 (1990) ("Mhe metamorphosis of a largely non-separating and nondivorcing society, such as England from the Middle Ages to the mid-nineteenth century, into a separating and divorcing one in the late twentieth, is perhaps the most
profound and far-reaching social change to have occurred in the last five hundred
years.").
2. See generally Friedman, Rights of Passage:Divorce Law in HistoricalPerspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649 (1984). In 1816, Louis de Bonald explained why divorce had
to be outlawed in France: "Just as political democracy, 'allows the people, the weak
part of political society, to rise against the established power,' so divorce, 'veritable
domestic democracy,' allows the wife, 'the weak part,' to rebel against marital authority." J. SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 47 (1988); see also R. PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY (1988).
3. See G. LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 123-40 (1986) ("[flor women, class is mediated through their sexual ties to a man". Lerner distinguishes "respectable" women (those who are attached to one man) from "not respectable" women
(those not attached to one man or free of all men)); C. HEILBRUN, REINVENTING WOMANHOOD 175 (1979); Silver, Salon, Foyer, Bureau: Women and the Professions in
France, in CLIO'S CONSCIOUSNESS RAISED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF
WOMEN 72, 81 (Hartman & Banner eds. 1974) (discussing French law entitling "all
women over the age of 25 . . . to be addressed as 'Madame,' even if unmarried" and
creating a legal action for slander for any woman over 25 who is persistently addressed
as "Mademoiselle"); see also Guillaumin, The Question of Difference, in FRENCH CONNECTIONS: VOICES FROM THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN FRANCE 64 (C. Duchen trans.
& ed. 1987) [hereinafter FRENCH CONNECTIONS].

4. As Martha Minow has noted, "A difficulty here, as always, is who is 'we.'"
Minow, Forward: Justice Engendered, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 10, 15 (1987); see also Resnik, Complex Feminist Conversations, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1, 7. In this paper, "we" or "our" refers to all of us, men as well as women.
5.

L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION xv (1985) (quoting English legal

scholar Kevin Gray).
6.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MaritalStatus and Liv-

ing Arrangements: March 1988, in CURRENT POPULATION REP., Ser. P. 20, No. 433, at
3 (1989); Wetzel, American Families:75 Years of Change, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar.,
1990, at 417. About half of American first marriages end in divorce; the corresponding
ratio in Europe ranges from one in three to one in four. Sorrentino, The Changing
Family in InternationalPerspective, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1990, at 41, 44. For
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This paper will explore some of the reasons for this predicament. My central thesis is that the glaring inadequacies of divorce
laws are less a function of badly devised rules7 or misconceptions as
to the proper role of the state,8 than of deeply held beliefs about
female and male roles. These attitudes cannot be reconciled with
the demands of the real world and the real needs of the parties at
divorce.
I approach the problem from a "psycho-feminist" perspective. 9
While several legal scholars have recognized the relevance of feminist psychoanalytic theory in the context of divorce law,10 it has not
yet been fully developed as a basis for a feminist critique of divorce.
I hope that this paper will become part of the ongoing dialogue

among feminists in different disciplines."1 Feminists have urged us
discussion of some of the ways in which divorce law fails us, see infra text accompanying notes 212-219.
7. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5; Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology,
Contradiction and Social Change-A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of
the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIs. L. REV. 789.
8. See generally Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study ofIdeology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) [hereinafter Olsen, Family and Market]; Olsen,
The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985) [hereinafter Olsen, Myth of State Intervention].
9. Those engaged in any aspect of the psychoanalytic critique of patriarchy will be
referred to as "psycho-feminists" throughout this paper. I was afraid that I had coined
this term until I saw it in Barr, Introduction, in DISCONTENTED DISCOURSES 1 (M.
Barr & R. Feldstein eds. 1989); N. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORY 15-16 (1989); authorities cited infra note 89.
10. Bartlett & Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency Dilemma, 2
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 41 n. 128 (1986); Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 LAW
& INEQUALIES 1, 19 n.73 (1984). See generally Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1907 & n.104
(1988) (noting psychodynamic focus of some feminist theorists); West, Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988) (describing "cultural feminists" as those
for whom "the important difference between men and women is that women raise children and men don't").
Charles Lawrence makes the point explicitly in the context of race discrimination,
noting the pertinence of his analysis to gender bias. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 n.22
(1987).
11. For notably effective uses of an interdisciplinary approach in legal scholarship,
see Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows": Toward a History ofFamily
Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819 (drawing on the work of feminist and family law historians
as well as the "law and society" school of historians); Heilbrun & Resnik, Convergences:
Law, Literature and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913 (1990); West, Communities, Text
and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature Movement, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 129 (1988); West, Economic Man and Literary Women: One Contrast, 39 MERCER
L. REV. 867 (1988). Like Toward a History ofFamily Law, this Article relies heavily on
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to listen to women themselves, rather than to experts. 12 Psychoanalysis has endeavored to make a science of listening. 13 Its methods
may help us make sense of what is being said, especially in the
cacophony of divorce. 14 A deeper understanding of divorce may
enable us not merely to reform, but to rethink, its purposes and
process.
The Article is divided into three parts. The first Part provides
an overview of divorce law for the general reader. Examples from
French as well as American law will be used to suggest the crosscultural applicability of the thesis. The observations about the psychological underpinnings of divorce law apply broadly to legal systems in western cultures, where the primary caretakers are almost
invariably women. As Professor Mary Ann Glendon has noted,
France and America, two industrialized western democracies which
have undertaken substantial divorce law reform within the last
twenty years, are similar enough to invite productive comparison. I'
the work of feminists in other disciplines to "advocate and undertake an inquiry that
peers beneath the traditional view of [family law]." Minow, supra, at 820.
For consideration of some of the ways in which psychoanalysis has infiltrated the
human sciences, see the essays collected in THE TRIAL(S) OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (F.

Meltzer ed. 1987).
12. Armstrong, Ideal Freedoms, Real Fears, in WOMEN'S REV. BOOKS, Nov. 1990,
at 9, 10, at col. 2. As Robin West has explained, "it is feminism's most crucial insight
that our experience must be primary--and not be trumped by posited ideals or definitions." West, infra note 142, at 115-16; see also C. HEILBRUN, WRITING A WOMAN'S
LIFE 20 (1988); Lyons, Listening to Voices We Have Not Heard, in MAKING CONNECTIONS: THE RELATIONAL WORLDS OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS AT EMMA WILLARD

SCHOOL 30 (C. Gilligan, N. Lyons & T. Hanmer eds. 1990); Introduction: Learning
About Women and Their Work Through Their Own Accounts in THE EXPERIENCE AND
MEANING OF WORK IN WOMEN'S LIVES I (N. Chester & H. Grossman eds. 1990).

13. See S. FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, reprinted in FREUD: THE STANDARD EDITION 19-20 (1966). This is particularly true of

psychoanalysis as practiced and interpreted by feminists, who have used its own methods to expose the deep gender bias of traditional psychoanalysis. See infra notes 84,
87-91; see also Abel, Book Review, 10 SIGNS 152, 153 (1984) ("[Gallop] . . suggests
that feminist polemics threaten to become rigid, authoritarian, and phallic, while psychoanalytic attention to the specifics of desire, in contrast to the universalizing thrust of
theory, is subversive, disruptive and feminine").
14. Bohannan, The Six Stations of Divorce, in LOMBARD, infra note 114, at 4
("[E]motional stimulation is so great [at divorce] that accustomed ways of acting are
inadequate. The usual way for the healthy mind to deal with trauma is to block it out,
then let it reappear slowly, so it is easier to manage .... On a social level we do something analogous, not allowing ourselves to think fully about divorce as a social problem.
Our personal distrust of the emotions that surround it leads us to consider it only with
traditional cultural defenses.").
15. My point is not to suggest concrete divorce reforms, but to question the terms
of the discourse itself by "unpacking" divorce from a psycho-feminist perspective. See
Jones, Writing the Body: Toward An Understanding of "L'ecriture feminine", 7 FEMINIST STUD. 247-63 (1981) (discussing Kristeva's idea that women should question ex-
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The second Part, which draws liberally on the work of feminists in other disciplines, briefly describes the gendered social context in which divorce functions. I argue that we cannot understand
divorce without understanding both its underlying norms and the
ways in which these norms are internalized. I rely on the work of
psycho-feminists to make these internalized norms explicit. The
third Part suggests a framework for a psycho-feminist critique of
divorce law. I submit that divorce law not only incorporates, but is
structured by, subconscious notions of gender. If we are to constructively recast rights and responsibilities under divorce law, we
have to understand the "dreams"-the subconscious reality-in
which they begin. 16
isting discourse rather than attempt to create an alternative); infra text accompanying
notes 237-245. See generally COMPARATIVE LAW OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY (A.
Kiralfy ed. 1972).
One of feminism's major strengths is the inclusiveness of its vision, its willingness
to embrace rather than eradicate difference. Resnick, supra note 4, at 7; see Matsuda,
Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 16-17 (1988); Minow, supra note 4; Luttrell, Book Review, 15
SIGNS 635, 636 (1990) (noting "a pluralism that flourishes within feminist thinking").
Comparative studies add dimension to this vision by requiring us to shift perspective
and to see ourselves as "different".
Professor Glendon cites Kahn-Freund's factors supporting family law comparison
in developed countries (including France and the United States) such as:
[G]radual cultural assimilation... people in ... New York and Paris
read the same kind of newspapers and weekly news, magazines, watch
similar (or the same) television programs ...gradual economic assimilation... [they] earn their living in ways almost indistinguishable from one
country to another and that their manner of spending their earnings follows similar patterns owning to the evolution of trade, mass production
and advertising .... One might add to this list the apparently declining
influence of formal religion, the apparent increase in family disorganization and.., the [increased] labor force participation rates of women.
M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY, supra note 1, at 18-19.
16. This may be seen as part of a larger feminist project described by Copp~lia
Kahn:
In The InterpretationofDreams Freud says, "There is at least one spot in
every dream at which it is unplumbable-a navel, as it were, that is its
point of contact with the unknown." For the first psychoanalyst, the
"navel" of psychic development is identification with the mother. It is
"unknown" to him not because it is unknowable but because he is a man,
because manhood as patriarchal culture creates it depends on denying, in
myriad ways, the powerful ambivalence that the mother inspires. Part of
our task as feminist critics, I suggest, is to excavate that gray, shadowy
region of identification, particularly male identification with the mother,
and trace its influence on perceptions and depictions of women in patriarchal texts.
Kahn, The Hand That Rocks the Cradle: Recent Gender Theories and Their Implications, in THE (M)OTHER TONGUE: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRE-

TATION 12, 88 (S.Garner, C. Kahane, & M. Sprengnether eds. 1985).
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AN OVERVIEW OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN DIVORCE LAW

Marriage establishes a legal relationship between a woman and
a man. The state legally terminates that relationship through divorce. 17 Regulation of marriage and divorce substantially defines
the state and the family, the primary unit
the relationship between
8
organization.'
of social
Divorce has become widely available in the U.S. and France
20
19
over the last twenty years. In response to changing mores, divorce almost became (as critics contended) available on demand in
France and the U.S. in the 1970s. Two generalizations about contemporary divorce are especially pertinent for our discussion. First,
21 As Professor Glendon
most divorces involve minor children.
points out, "[iln France, as elsewhere, children remain with their
17. Cf. Pateman, The Shame of the Marriage Contract, in WOMEN'S VIEWS OF
THE POLITICAL WORLD OF MEN

69, 97 (J. Stiehm ed. 1984) (arguing that contract is

order
unnecessary in personal life and that the "theory and practice of a feminist social
649
lies beyond both status and contract." See generally Friedman, supra note 2, at
legal
the
from
...
contribution
any
without
.
.
fade.
can
love
("Marriages can rot, [and]
system. Divorce is a legal act, and it changes the legal status of the partners.").
18. See Olsen, Family and Market, supra note 8; Taub & Schneider, Perspectiveson

Women's Subordinationand the Role of Law, in

THE POLITICS OF LAW:

A

PROGRES-

Ideology, in
SIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982); see also Marx & Engels, The German
ed.
MARX & ENGELS: BASIC WRITING ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 248 (Feuer
1959).
19. Before then, it was available under very limited circumstances in most Ameriof the
can states. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 652-64. For a concise description

"eventful and colorful" history of French divorce, see M.

GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND

law was instituted in
FAMILY, supra note 1, at 202-204. In 1792, liberal divorce
diFrance, substantially restricted in 1804, and abolished entirely in 1816. In 1884,
infamous
an
to
"condemnation
adultery,
for
only
granted
vorce was reestablished but
dispunishment and grave violation of marital duties." Id. at 202. Professor Glendon
deux
"les
between
struggle
ongoing
the
in
battlegrounds
the
cusses divorce as one of
Frances,' " one conservative, Catholic, and family-oriented and the other characterized
by the liberal individualistic ideas of the Enlightenment. Id.
20. See E. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY: IDEOLCourt's role in faciliOGY AND ISSUES 5-9 (1986) (discussion of United States Supreme
in
tating social change and analysis of pivotal family law cases between 1968 and 1973
adjustthe
impeding
were
that
doctrines
legal
"overturned
Court
which the Supreme
ment of law to changes already well advanced"); Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 179
(1982).

21. M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 93 (1988) (citing
Custody and
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Divorce, Child
23, No. 84,
P.
Series
STUDIES,
SPECIAL
REP.,
Child Support, in CURRENT POPULATION

at 8 (1979)). See generally Scott, Rational DecisionmakingAbout Marriageand Divorce,
76 VA. L. REV. 9, 14 (1990) (suggesting different regimes for divorce depending on

whether minor children are involved); Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards:
Legal Standards and EmpiricalPatternsfor Child Custody, Support and Visitation After
Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (1979).
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mothers after divorce in the great majority (about 85 percent) of
cases."' 22 Second, the woman's standard of living generally plummets after divorce. As Professor Weitzman has noted, American
women experience "a 73 percent decline in standard of living in the
23
first year after divorce."
A.

The Purposes of Divorce

The purposes of divorce are to divide the parties' property
fairly between them, 24 to set the amount and time period for any
continuing support obligations, 2 5 and to determine their respective
rights and responsibilities with regard to their children, including
custody, 26 visitation, and child support. 27 Finally, divorce frees the
parties from the bonds of matrimony, permitting'each to remarry. 2
The terms of the divorce are usually established through negotia22. M. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 1, at 215.
23. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 36; see infra notes 191 & 194 and accompany-

ing text.
24. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 22 FAM. L.Q.
367, 393-94 (1989) (table showing property distribution by state). For a description of
the basic systems of property distribution in the United States, see J. AREEN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, 595-602 (2d. ed. 1985); cf. L. WEITZMAN, supra
note 5, at 87 passim (discussing with approval English practice of considering the welfare of the children first in dividing marital property).
25. Although there is no longer any alimony under French law, the difference between the prestation compensatoire and alimony is probably academic. The compensatoire is a lump sum settlement, intended to compensate the spouse in the
disadvantageous position at the termination of the marriage. Since the payor (almost
invariably the husband) is often unable to make a lump sum payment, he may be permitted to pay the settlement in installments. M. GLENDON, supra note 21, at 84. See
generally Meulders-Klein, FinancialAgreements on Divorce and the Freedom of Contract in Continental Europe, in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 297, 304 (J. Eekelaar & S.Katz ed. 1984).
26. By "custody," I mean actual physical custody as well as "legal" custody, which
refers to shared decisionmaking responsibility. See also infra note 186. For a concise
compilation of authorities on the varieties of custodial arrangements, see Bartlett &
Stack, supra note 10, at 11 n.7.
27. See generally Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language and Legal
Change in Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 732 (1988) ("The dominant rhetoric no longer describes divorce as a process that terminates the relationship
between spouses, establishing one as the custodial parent with clear responsibilities.
Rather, divorce is now described as a process that, through mediation, restructures and
reformulates the spouses' relationship, conferring equal or shared parental rights on
both parents ....").
28. As Glendon has pointed out, in French cases of unilateral nonfault divorce
(what Dorothy Stetson notes has been referred to as "divorce by repudiation," D. STETSON, infra note 32, at 92), the plaintiff "obtains little more than legal permission to
remarry, so completely is he bound to the economic obligations of the old marriage."
M. GLENDON, supra note 21, at 85.

1490

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1483

tion, mediation, 29 and judicial intervention. 30 The final judgment
typically incorporates the agreed upon or judicially determined
terms and conditions of the divorce, and it may set forth the
grounds upon which the divorce was granted.
31
Prior to the enactment of the no-fault statutes in the 1970's,
divorce laws required a party to assert grounds, such as adultery,
cruelty, or desertion, in order to obtain a divorce. This gave bargaining leverage to the so called "innocent" spouse, that is, the one
who had not committed any acts constituting legal "fault," without
whose consent or acquiescence there could be no divorce.
B.

The Process of Divorce

Since the 1970's, French and American couples have had a
number of options for terminating marriage. 32 In both countries,
divorce may be by mutual consent 33 or for "cause" (including traditional "fault" grounds, such as desertion, cruelty, and adultery). In
both countries, moreover, unilateral divorce; that is, divorce at the
29. Mediation is negotiation in the presence of an intermediary. See infra text accompanying notes 151-171.
30. In the U.S., family court judges may simply "rubberstamp" a settlement arrived at by the parties. If the American spouses are unwilling to negotiate with each
other, the terms of the divorce will be decided by the judge after a plenary hearing. In
France, the judge is expected to play an active role in this process. See infra text accompanying notes 172-173. This often takes the form of putting pressure on the parties
to resolve matters independently. Id.
31. See generally Friedman, supra note 2, at 664-69 for a discussion of the legal
history of no-fault divorce in the United States. For introductory overviews of no-fault
divorce laws, under which "irreconcilable differences," "breakdown of the marriage,"
or "incompatibility" are among the grounds for divorce, see J. AREEN, supra note 24, at
267-75; H. CLARK & C. GLOWINSKY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES AND PROBLEMS
747-58 (4th ed. 1990); W. WADLINGTON, DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 1052-60 (2d ed. 1990). See generally L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5.
Professor Areen has recently pointed out, "It appears that courts in states with
both fault and no-fault grounds are beginning to construe the fault grounds more narrowly again, no doubt because there is less pressure for broad constructions." J.
AREEN, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 85 (2d ed. Supp. 1991).
32. The American "breakdown of the marriage" divorce is basically the equivalent
of the French divorce by mutual consent. D. STETSON, WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN FRANCE
91 (1987). For a table of grounds for divorce in the fifty states, see Freed & Walker,
supra note 24, at 385-86. Since all of the states have some form of no-fault divorce,
grounds are rarely the focus of litigation. Id. at 372, 383. For descriptions and breakdowns of "Les cas de divorce" in France, see STATISTIQUE ANNUELLE, supra note 1, at
43-44.
33. For a discussion of "living separate and apart," which is a no-fault ground for
divorce in twenty-two states, see H. CLARK & C. GLOWINSKY, supra note 31, at
746-47; see also supra note 32. Divorce by mutual consent is increasingly common in
France. Rubellin-Devichi, France: The New Principlesof Family Law-Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, 28 J. FAM. L. 491, 492 (1989-90).
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behest of only one of the spouses without allegati6ns of fault, is
available. In France, a spouse may obtain unilateral divorce only
on the
after six years separation, and at considerable financial cost,
' 34
In the
common.'
in
life
the
of
disruption
"prolonged
of
grounds
U.S., no-fault divorce laws generally permit unilateral divorce after
a much shorter period of separation. 35 Thus, a spouse may now
obtain divorce in both countries notwithstanding the lack of consent
from the other spouse.
The choice of one method of divorce over another may have
some economic consequences. 36 Egregious fault on the part of one
spouse may lead the court to view the other more sympathetically,
for example. With the notable exception of unilateral divorce in
France,37 however, the economic difference in outcome typically depends more on the parties or judge than on the legal basis for
38
divorce.
C.

Problems with Divorce in France and the US.

Courts have long recognized that the financially dependent
spouse usually requires continued economic assistance from the
supporting spouse at divorce, and that the former is almost always
the wife and the latter is almost always the husband. 39 Divorce
laws which required that the spouse seeking divorce establish fault
on the part of the other party traditionally functioned, in part, as a
mechanism for redress. 4° An innocent wife could keep the marriage
intact until-and unless-her husband agreed to terms acceptable
to her. This leverage, however, was often dearly bought, requiring
the innocent spouse to remain married to the philandering, abusing
34. Glendon, The French Divorce Reform Law of 1976, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 199,
203 (1976).

35. See Freed & Walker, supra note 24, at 385-86 (19 states require that the parties
live apart 2 years or less; the longest period of separation required is 5 years [Idaho]);
see also Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 5 nn.19-20, 6 n.22 (1987) (describing "pure" no-fault and
two forms of mixed fault/no fault regimes in the states).
36. For tables showing states in which fault is a factor in equitable distribution or
alimony, see Freed & Walker, supra note 24, at 408-409.
37. See Glendon, supra note 34.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 166-171.
39. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at xi-xiv.
40. See Melli, Constructing a Social Problem: The Post Divorce Plight of Women
and Children, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 759, 762.
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imposed practical,
or absent spouse. 4 1 The fault requirement also
42
moral and psychological barriers to divorce.
Critics claimed the fault requirement was unresponsive to
changing social standards. It left unhappily married people few alternatives to collusive fabrication of fault grounds and a resultant
43
contempt for the law.
No-fault divorce has been condemned for different reasons, but
with equal vehemence." It has been blamed for depriving women
of the only real leverage they had in divorce proceedings, for treating men and women the same when the world does not, and for
contributing to the "feminization of poverty" 45 by making divorce
41. See id. at 770 (criticizing Weitzman for ignoring the dilemma of such women).
As Professor Melli has noted, women who decided to end a marriage also suffered the
economic hardship of a guilty spouse, that is, a spouse whose acts amounted to "fault"
grounds under the law.
42. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 9, 14; see Friedman, supra note 2, at 653 (discussing historical conflict in divorce law between "two genuine social demands.... One
was a demand that the law lend moral and physical force to the sanctity and stability of
marriage. The other was a demand that the law permit people to choose and change
their legal relations."); Sackett & Munyon, Alimony: A Retreat From TraditionalConcepts of Spousal Support, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 297, 303 (1985-86) (attributing adoption
of no-fault divorce to societal perception that moral issues of divorce "did not belong in
the courtroom" and that the fault system was hypocritical).
43. D. STETSON, supra note 32, at 90 (France); L. WEITZMAN supra note 5, at 10
(U.S.).
44. M. GLENDON, supra note 21, at 108 ("The no-fault terminology fit neatly into
an increasingly popular mode of discourse in which values are treated as a matter of
taste, feelings of guilt are regarded as unhealthy, and an individual's primary responsibility is assumed to be to himself."); L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5; Fineman, supra note
7. Few, however, would seriously suggest a return to fault divorce. L. WEITZMAN,
supra note 5, at 383; accord Sackett & Munyon, supra note 42, at 306; see Kay, An
Appraisal of California's No-fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291 (1987); Kay,
supra note 35.
It should be noted that, notwithstanding widespread and impassioned criticism of
divorce, women and men report that their lives are "better and more satisfying" after
divorce. Melli, supra note 40, at 767; cf. Wallerstein, Women After Divorce:Preliminary
Report from a Ten-Year Follow-Up, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 65, 68 (1985) (divorced women were more likely than divorced men to consider their quality of life
improved following divorce, in a study of mostly white, middle class Northern California families). See generally C. RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK: WOMEN AND MEN MAKE
SENSE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1990).

45. This phrase refers to the fact that female-headed households comprise a burgeoning underclass. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5. The poverty rate for black
mothers is about three times that of white mothers. Scales-Trent, Black Women and the
Constitution:Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9,
33 (1989). But cf N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1986, at A21, col. 3 (citing congressional study
challenging Reagan administration's position that the decade's rise in poverty is attributable to an increase in teenage pregnancies and single parent households; high unemployment and falling wages found to be the factors most responsible); American
Women: Three Decades of Change: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 98th
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easier to obtain and cheaper for men. 46 The post-reform divorce
process itself has been condemned for being drawn out, expensive,
47
unpredictable, and unfair.
Even if this is all true, I believe that the most egregious consequence of divorce is that it perpetuates and exacerbates the effects of
patriarchy, or, to use Gayle Rubin's apt phrase, the sex/gender system. 4 8 What is most deplorable about the legal process of divorce is
that it masks this. It is the sex/gender system, rather than divorce,
that is responsible for women's impoverishment. Divorce exaggerates the already sharp contrast between the family and marketplace
obligations of a husband and wife, and increases the disparity in
their respective economic situations.49 Upon divorce, women usually get physical custody of the children, and the attendant expenses 0 and impediments to their own career advancement and
Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1983) [hereinafter American Women] (noting that from 1959 to
1979 women increased as a percentage of poor adults, but that a declining percentage of
all women were poor).
46. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at xi-xiv.
47. See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5; Fineman, supra note 7; Stark, Burning

Down the House: Toward a Theory of More Equitable Distribution, 40 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1173, 1191-93 & nn. 79-84 (1988); The First Year Report of the New Jersey
Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 129,

150-51, 155-65 (1986) [hereinafter Women in the Courts].
48. Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157, 168 (R. Reiter ed. 1975) ("[I]t is im-

portant-even in the face of a depressing history-to maintain a distinction between the
human capacity and necessity to create a sexual world, and the empirically oppressive
ways in which sexual worlds have been organized. Patriarchy subsumes both meanings
into the same term. Sex/gender system.., is a neutral term which refers to the domain
and indicates that oppression is not inevitable .... ").
49. Cf. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 11 (observing that "traditional divorce perpetuated the sex based division of roles"). See generally Bruch, The Definition and
Division ofMarital Property in California:Towards Parityand Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS
L.J. 769, 776 (1982) ("[The] system stands in need of reform .... [M]arriage [should
not] entail . . . strikingly disparate post divorce wealth."). An unemployed single
mother of two subsists on half of the net average of a production worker's salary in the
U.S. While social benefits bring her French counterpart's income up to at least 67% of
the average production worker's, she too is part of a growing underclass. As Professor
Glendon warns, "The situation of a female head of a family with minor children is
precarious everywhere." M. GLENDON, supra note 21, at 91; see also B. ACKERMAN,
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46-71 (1984) (discussing the need to extend and

enrich legal paradigms through the construction of a broad temporal frame). Ackerman assumes that "the obvious problem ... serves as a symptom of a potentially larger
problem of social disorganization." Id. at 54. Here, "the obvious problem" is the difference in post-divorce responsibilities of the man and woman, and it is symptomatic of
the larger problem of the gender-based division of labor.
50. As Carolyn Bruch has observed, "[E]very time a judge overlooks expenses related to a child's needs or underestimates costs involved in child-raising, the burden
falls entirely on the custodial parent." M. GLENDON, supra note 21, at 87 (construing
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financial autonomy. Men are charged with some continuing financial responsibility, although their payments usually taper off,51 and
they are rarely expected to assume a significant care-giving role.
II.
A.

PUTTING DIVORCE IN CONTEXT

The Sex/Gender System

Patriarchy has been described as "any kind of group organization in which males hold dominant power and determine what part
females shall and shall not play."' 52 Feminist analyses of such group
organizations-including legislative bodies, 53 economic units (from
the nuclear family 54 to international cartels 5 ), social clubs, 56 the
Bruch, Developing Standardsfor Child Support Payments: A Critique of Current Practice, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 50-52 (1982)). Child support is consistently inadequate. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 667(a)
(1988) (requiring each state to establish guidelines by law, judicial or administrative
action, for child support awards); Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systemic
Imposition of Costs on Women, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1983). Such guidelines need
not be binding. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1988). The statute neither requires nor encourages
consistency among the states. See generally T. ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN: NEW ESTIMATES OF PARENTAL EXPENDITURES (1984); NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: A COMPENDIUM (ABA 1990);

Giampetro, Mathematical Approaches to Calculating Child Support Payments: Stated
Objectives, PracticalResults, and Hidden Policies, 20 FAM. L.Q. 373, 374 (1986); Williams, Guidelinesfor Setting Levels of Child Support Orders, 21 FAM. L.Q. 281 (1987).
Noncompliance with support orders is also a significant problem. See infra text accompanying notes 220-236.
51. Support is received for less than half of the 600,000 children in France for
whom it has been ordered. D. STETSON, supra note 32, at 99. In the U.S., a 1981
Census Bureau survey showed that less than half of the women who were awarded child
support received it as ordered; approximately 30% received partial payment; 25% received nothing. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 283.
52. Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy,3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 83
(1980). See generally B. HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM

87-117 (1981); G. LERNER, supra note 3.
53. S.DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 139 (1974) (French women could not vote
until 1945); see also infra note 143.
54. L. TILLY & J.W. SCOTT, WOMEN, WORK AND FAMILY, 41-53 (1987); see Ol-

sen, Family and Market, supra note 8; Olsen, Myth of State Intervention, supra note 8;
infra notes 101, 102, & 191-192.
55. C. ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES AND BASES: MAKING FEMINIST SENSE OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1989).
56. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537
(1987) (upholding state's compelling interest in assuring women equal access to public
accommodations); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (state may compel club
to admit women); Tiger Inn v. Edwards, 636 F. Supp. 787 (D.N.J. 1986) (Princeton
male-only eating clubs challenged); Bell, Private Clubs and Public Judges: A Nonsubstantive Debate About Symbols, 59 TEX. L. REV.733 (1981); Rogers, The PrivateClubs
Problem: Getting in the Front Door, 4 GEORGETOWN J.L. ETHICS 129 (1990); N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § 4, at 22, col. I (criticism of Senate Judiciary Committee ap-
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judiciary," 7 academia,58 the Catholic church, 59 and the military 6° suggest the ubiquity of patriarchy. 61 Feminist anthropologists, noting the "endless variety and monotonous similarity, cross-culturally
and throughout history [of the oppression of women], ' ' 62 have described the basic features of the sex/gender system. 63 Males acquire
dominance in such a system through "'the principle of legitimacy,'
a de facto or de jure law that birth should not occur to a woman
who is not attached to a man." 64 Control of female sexuality is a
core tenet of the sex/gender system, because it is through such control that the male can be certain that his heirs are his own blood
descendants. 65 Male control of female sexuality, while not the sole
proval of nomination of Vaughn Walker, despite his longstanding membership in a club
that excludes women and only recently admitted black men).
57. Kessler, Forward, Symposium: National Association of Women Judges, 14
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 473 (1984); see infra text accompanying notes 178-182 and
authorities cited in notes 181-185.
58. C. HEILBRUN, The Politics of Mind: Women, Tradition, and the University, in
HAMLET'S MOTHER 213 (1990); D. HOLLAND & M. EISENHART, EDUCATED IN ROMANCE: WOMEN, ACHIEVEMENT AND COLLEGE CULTURE (1990); Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law Faculties, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 537.(1988); Pedagogy,Law, Theory, and Practice, Women in Legal Education, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1988).
59. U. RANKE-HEINEMANN, EUNUCHS FOR THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN: WOMEN, SEXUALITY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1990).
60. C. BARKALOW & A. RAAB, IN THE MEN'S HOUSE: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF
LIFE IN THE ARMY BY ONE OF WEST POINT'S FIRST FEMALE GRADUATES (1990).

61. Special Issue: The Ideology of Mothering: Disruption and Reproduction of Patriarchy, 15 SIGNS 441 (Spr. 1990).
62. Rubin, supra note 48, at 160.
63. This descriptive project is a limited one and does not attempt to ascertain the
origins of the sex/gender system. Given the complexity of the system and the interdependence of its components, the quest for an explanation of its beginnings has little
urgency, especially when it is acknowledged that gender arrangements are not biologically determined. See N. CHODOROW, supra note 9; infra notes 74-76.
64. Moen, Women's Rights and Reproductive Freedom, 3 HUM. RTS. Q., Spr.,
1981, at 53, 58 & n. 19; accord Copelon, Unpacking Patriarchy: Reproduction, Sexuality,
Originalism, and Constitutional Change, in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 303, 309 (J. Lobel ed. 1988). See
Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S.Ct. 2333 (1989) (holding that
conclusive presumption that child born during marriage is the husband's child does not
violate rights of biological father). Compare Justice Brennan's thoughtful dissent
("Even if we can agree... that 'family' and 'parenthood' are part of the good life, it is
absurd to assume that we can agree on the content of those terms and destructive to
pretend that we do"). Id. at 2351. See generally Filhiol, Michael H. v. Gerald D.:
Upholding the Marital Presumption Against a Dual Paternity Claim, 50 LA. L. REV.
1015 (1990); Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Constitutional Rights of Putative Fathers and a Proposal for Reform, 31 B.C.L. REV. 1173 (1990); Note, Putative Fathers
and Parental Interests: A Search for Protection, 65 IND. L.J. 939 (1989-90).
65. As Professor Glendon has observed, "[T]he worldwide transformation of the
status of children born out of wedlock has gone far toward depriving marriage of one of
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factor, is a major cause of women's social subordination. 66 Equally
important, the sex/gender system is characterized by a genderin which women assume almost total rebased division of labor 67 68
childcare.
for
sponsibility
its traditionally most important effects: that of distinguishing the family through which
rank and wealth could be transmitted." M. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FAMILY LAW, supra note 1, at 285. See generally, F. ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE
FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE 125 (1884).
66. Moen, supra note 64. Rape and limits on reproductive choice vividly exemplify
the ways in which male control of female sexuality results in women's social subordination. Women defer to husbands and boyfriends not only to deter intramarital and date
rape, but to keep them as "protectors" against strange men. See West, supra note 10, at
45 ("The woman denies her need for physical individuation because she refuses to risk
the reenactment of rape"); J. KAUFFMAN, PLACES IN THE WORLD A WOMAN COULD
WALK (1983); Celis, Date Rape and a List at Brown, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1990, § 1, at
26, col. 1; cf. Rubin, supra note 48, at 163 (women in the Amazon Valley and the New
Guinea highlands "are frequently kept in their place by gang rape when the ordinary
mechanisms of masculine intimidation prove insufficient."). See generally Pineau, Date
Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217 (1989).
The image of women as "barefoot and pregnant" epitomizes social subordination.
Males control female reproductive capacity in countless ways, from court decisions
stressing the (usually male) doctor's role in deciding when abortion should be permitted
(Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1972)) to the actual control of reproductive technology and aggregate decisionmaking regarding population growth. B. HARTMANN,
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS (1987); REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S
(S. Cohen & N. Taub eds. 1989).
67. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
68. This leads to the breadwinner/nurturer dichotomy and the devaluation of nurturing work. Although this takes myriad forms, this paper focuses on "the typical pattern [in middle class families in the West] of babies attended by one lone mother." J.
BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM AND THE PROBLEM
OF DOMINATION 75 n.* (1988). Benjamin notes, however, that "patterns of childrear-

ing have been changing in favor of paternal participation-in these families." Id. See
generally E. JANEWAY, CROSS SECTIONS: FROM A DECADE OF CHANGE (1982). For
descriptions of varied family experiences in the United States, see Minow, supra note
11, at 860-64.
Theorists of patriarchy have been criticized for being ahistorical, in that their analysis "rests on a physical difference ...[which] takes on a universal and unchanging
aspect." J. SCOTT, supra note 2, at 34. The consequences of any "physical difference"
change radically when women control their own reproductive capacity. Where women
have access to contraception, including abortion and reproductive technology such as
artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization, it becomes possible (at least physiologically) for them to choose not to have children, to have them only with men who assume
active parenting responsibility, or to have children without men. Thus, the "difference"
on which patriarchy is predicated is not fixed and ahistorical, but may take innumerable
forms, several of which undermine patriarchy. See generally S. FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX (1970); C. HEILBRUN, TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF ANDROGYNY
(1973); POWERS OF DESIRE (A. Snitow, C. Stansell & S. Thompson eds. 1983); REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s, supra note 66; Gordon, Voluntary Motherhood: The
Beginnings of Feminist Birth Control Ideas in the United States, in CLIO'S CONSCIOUSNESS RAISED, supra note 3, at 54; Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriageof Marxism and
Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, 8 CAPITAL AND CLASS 1 (1979).
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Divorce law is permeated by the values of the sex/gender system, not only because it evolved within a patriarchal context, but
because it addresses precisely those relationships which form the
nucleus of the system.69 Women as well as men internalize these
values. 70 How can we analyze that in which we are immersed?
How can we think about a sex/gender system when it determines
our modes of thinking?7 ' Although patriarchy is pervasive, it is not
hermetic.72 Feminists have used psychoanalysis as a method of ripping open the system and exposing its most fundamental premises.
By delving into the unconscious, they have undertaken the pains73
taking analysis of the dominant discourse.
69. It has been suggested that "law" itself "refers to patriarchy, the law of the
father." Gallop, The Father's Seduction, in THE (M)OTHER TONGUE, supra note 16, at
33, 46; see also Foster, Antigones in the Bar: Women Lawyers as Reluctant Adversaries,
10 LEGAL STUD. F. 287, 288 (1986). As Catherine Mackinnon has explained, "The law
sees and treats women the way men see and treat women." MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 644
(1983). Robin West argues that "all of our modern legal theory... is essentially and
irretrievably masculine" because it is predicated on "the claim that we are individuals
'first' ... that what separates us is epistemologically and morally prior to what connects
us-while 'trivially true' of men,... (this is] patently untrue of women." West, supra
note 10, at 2.
70. See BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING (1977) (showing how, in art as well as in advertising, women are portrayed from a male perspective, which female as well as male
viewers internalize); Kaplan, Is the Gaze Male?, in POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note 68,
at 309 (analyzing how women are portrayed in films).
71. Deconstructionist, as well as feminist, philosophers, linguists, and legal scholars have struggled with this concept. Articles providing a useful introduction to subjects barely touched upon here include: J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY
AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM (1982); J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY
ix-xxxvii (C. Spivak trans. 1976); Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96
YALE L.J. 743 (1987) (introduction to Derrida's ideas for legal readers).
See also Minow, supra note 4, at 13 & n. 15 (discussing assumptions about race and
gender embedded in the "very structure of our language"); Williams, supra note 20, at
190 & nn.80-81 (noting that the "tender years" presumption and joint custody of children after divorce are areas where "the move toward equality of the sexes might come
into collision with cultural limits, both in judicial opinions and in ourselves"); cf. K.
MARX, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, reprinted in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 405-416 (L. Easton & K. Guddat eds. 1967) (discussing
ideology, or false consciousness).
For a feminist critique of critical social theory, see West, Feminism, Critical Social
Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. L. F. 59, 61 (Foucault's emphasis on discourse frustrates
the recognition of patriarchy as fundamentally nondiscoursive and "pervasively
violent").
72. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 875 (1990). For
perceptive and acute fictional treatments of ways in which women deal with apparently
"closed" sex/gender systems, see M. ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986); M.

(1977).
73. See Z. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 10, 11 (quoting Cathe-

KINGSTON, THE WOMAN WARRIOR

rine Belsey, "A discourse is a domain of language-use, a particular way of talking (and
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Psychoanalysisand Gendered Intrapsychic Constructs

We no longer assume that nurturing behavior is biologically
determined. 74 There is no "nurturing" hormone produced along
with mother's milk. There is no "nurturing" gene located in the
extra X chromosome. 75 If anatomy is not destiny, the sex/gender
system is not immutable. If neither female nurturing nor male
breadwinning is predetermined, role should become a matter of
writing and thinking). A discourse involves certain shared assumptions which appear in
the formulations that characterize it." (emphasis in original)); Elshtain, Feminist Discourse and its Discontents: Language, Power, and Meaning, in FEMINIST THEORY: A
CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 127 (N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo & B. Gelpi eds. 1982); Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1987) (describing the "French feminists (who] attack language more explicitly, finding in the
disruption of male language the only possible expression of a female voice."); see also
Fineman, supra note 27 (arguing for a return to a rights approach in custody disputes);
cf. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 326 (drawing upon theories of unconscious motivation
to explain ideology). Gender constructs may well function on the "collective unconscious" level described by Professor Lawrence, but my focus here is more on individual,
albeit common, intrapsychic patterns.
74. R.W. Connell has suggested that although it became clear in the 19th century
that sexual and gender arrangements were not biologically determined, sociopolitical
forces precluded a critical sociology. R.W. CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER (1987).
Such a sociology is now widely recognized. See, e.g., R. BLEIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER 80-109, 109 (1984) ("As many others have said ... the range of variation is far
greater among males or among females than between the two sexes." (emphasis in
original)); N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 13, 30 (1978) (countering the "prevalent assumption among nonfeminist theorists that the structure of
parenting is biologically self-explanatory." Chodorow presents data from studies of the
effect of female chromosomes and hormones on nurturing behavior, concluding that,
"the extensive and nearly exclusive mothering role (that women] have is a product of a
social and cultural translation of their childbearing and lactation capacities. It is not
guaranteed or entailed by these capacities themselves."); Shapiro, Guns and Dolls:
Scientists Explore the Differences Between Girls and Boys, Newsweek, May 28, 1990, at
56 (cover story). See generally Williams, supra note 20, at 185 n.58 (discussing male
agression).
The idea that biology does not determine parenting capacity has been acknowledged in the U.S. courts. See Freeman v. Freeman, 163 Mich. App. 493, 414 N.W. 2d
914 (1987) (appellate court reversed trial court's award of joint custody on grounds that
custody would have been awarded to the father but for an unsubstantiated biological
preference in favor of granting the mother custody of her daughter). But see S.
GOLDBERG, THE INEVITABILITY OF PATRIARCHY 78 passim (1973).

A critical difference between French and American feminists is that the French are
"more convinced ... of the difference between male and female; they are more imbued
with notions of sexual specificity." NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS, infra note 90, at 36.
Some North American feminists share the French perspective. Robin West, for example, argues that women's actual physical experiences of attachment are not dependent
on nurturing roles. Resnik, supra note 10, at 1915. See generally R. HUBBARD, THE
POLITICS OF WOMEN'S BIOLOGY (1990); T. LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD (1990).
75. "At most there may be a temporary hormonal response associated with child-

birth that prompts females to nurture their young." Shapiro, supra note 74, at 59.

1991] DIVORCE LAW, FEMINISM & PSYCHOANALYSIS

1499

the
choice. In theory, and in the expectations of many feminists,
76
eroded.
foundations
its
sex/gender system would collapse as
The contemporary recognition that roles are not innately
gendered has supported an expanded jurisprudence of equality in
the employment context. Legislatures and courts have increasingly
recognized the rights of women to participate in male-dominated
economic spheres.7 7 Traditional stereotypes about the proper role
of women have undergone a radical, if incomplete, transformation. 78 But although women have entered some professions, their
opportunities remain limited. As Professor Martha Fineman has
shown, women have not necessarily benefitted from "equality" oriented reforms. 79 Women remain nurturers, by and large, regardless
76. See generally E. BADINTER, L'UN EST L'AUTRE: DES RELATIONS ENTRE
HOMMES ET FEMMES 191-240 (1986) (discussing "la mort du patriarcat"). I am not
suggesting that there are no differences between male and female. Rather, there are few
enough to give us ample scope to refuse the "dichotomous trap" and instead, to make
the "case for equality as a relative matter of justice.. . not as an absolute question either
of science, social science or nature." Scott, The Pitfalls of Scientific Feminism (Book
Review), 4 TIKKUN 90 (1989) (criticizing Deceptive Distinctions by Cynthia Fuchs Epstein for attempting to base political claims on "nature and objectivity").
77. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportaion Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Cowan, Women's Rights Through Litigation:An Examinationof the ACL U Women's Rights Project,
1971-76, 8 COLUM. HUM. RS. L. REV. 373 (1976); Williams, Sex Discrimination:
Closing the Law's Gender Gap, in THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE
SUPREME COURT, 1969-1986, at 109 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987). This is not to suggest, of
course, that parity has been attained. Scholarship deploring and explaining the continuing absence of parity is far too vast to be distilled in one footnote. See, e.g., Colker,
Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1003, 1015 (1986); Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender
Justice, 97 YALE L.J. 914 (1987); Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require More Than
Assimilation, Accommodation or Separation From the Existing Social Structure?, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 825, 830 n.23 (1985) (distinguishing special treatment from affirmative action); see also D. STETSON, supra note 32, at 146-48 (describing French policy set
forth in 13 July 1983 law of rattrapage["catch-up"] which encourages positive discrimination); Silver, supra note 3, at 73 (labor force participation is an "ambiguous" indicator of equality between the sexes). But cf. T. SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990) (critizing affirmative action in general for, inter
alia, demoralizing its recipients). Legislatures, while uncertain about the underlying
cause, have tried to address the consequences. See Kilborn, Wage Gap Between Sexes is
Cut in Test, but at a Price, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
Commentators have expressed concern regarding the impact on women of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989)
and Martin v. Wilkes, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). See Coyle, How Far Will The Court Go?,
Nat. L.J., June 26, 1989, at 1, 46. See generally Employment Discrimination and Affirmative Action: Have Civil Rights Been Eroded?, 1989 Supreme Court Decisions, 7
N.Y.L.J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1990).
78. See e.g., Cole, To Each Her Own, in TIME, Fall 1990, at 46 (Special Issue Women: The Road Ahead); infra notes 103-107.
79. Fineman, supra note 7; Fineman, supra note 27; Fineman, Illusive Equality: On
Weitzman's Divorce Revolution, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 781 [hereinafter Illusive

1500

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1483

of their marital status, 0 family law reforms,8 1 or economic consequences.8 2 Their continuing responsibility in the home limits their
choices as well as their advancement.8 3 Since we assume that nurturing is neither innate nor gender-specific, we are baffled and irritated when tinkering with the social environment fails to produce
gender neutral results.
A feminist psychoanalytic approach offers explanations.
Psycho-feminists have adopted much of the method, while questioning or rejecting the values of traditional psychoanalysis.8 4 A
Equality]; Fineman & Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking:
Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REv. 107 (1987); Sheppard, Women,
Families and Equality: Was Divorce a Mistake?, 12 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 137 (1990).
80. See infra notes 98, 116 & 191.
81. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 215-18.
82. See infra notes 191-195.
83. This has been described for women in business as a "glass ceiling." Schwartz,
Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at
65. Schwartz criticizes the term "glass ceiling" as a way of glossing over the real factors; i.e., different values and social roles responsible for the differences in male and
female job performance and opportunities. She is less interested in the reasons for
gendered social roles than in pragmatically accommodating them.
84. Freud has been criticized by feminists since Karen Homey, who questioned his
precept that "anatomy is destiny," N. CHODOROW, supra note 74, at 141 (citing S.
FREUD, THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX (1924)), his emphasis on "instinct," and his resultant views on feminine psychology. K. HORNEY, NEW WAYS IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS 24, 38-39 (1939). Freud contended, for example, "that mothers'
greater identification with daughters in the pre-Oedipal stage stimulates the development of an ego whose boundaries are more permeable than those of sons and a self more
defined by attachment to others." While feminists such as Nancy Chodorow agree with
this basic postulate, they reject Freud's conclusion that it renders women psychologically inferior. Luepnitz, Psychoanalysis and/or Feminism, WOMEN'S REV. BOOKS, May

1990, at 17, col. 2. See C. HEILBRUN, Freud's Daughters, in HAMLET'S MOTHER,
supra note 58, at 31, 33 (discussing the cost to early female analysts of "their acceptance
of and suffering with [Freud's] fatal gender bifurcation").
According to some feminist analysts,
psychoanalytic theory makes several questionable assumptions about the
role of gender and family in the formation of the ego. First, the assumption that the sexual division of labor, gender personality, and heterosexuality rest on a biological and instinctual basis. Second, that proper ego
development requires a nuclear family with authority vested in the father
and "an inevitable and necessary single mother-infant relationship."
Third, that (as Adrienne Rich says), "the two-person mother-child relationship is by nature regressive, circular, unproductive, and that all culture depends on the father-son relationship .... Through the resolution

of the Oedipal complex, the boy makes his way into the male world.., of
patriarchal law and order."
Kahn, supra note 16, at 74 (citing A. RICH, infra note 88, at 197); see also Goleman,
Stereotypes of the Sexes Persisting in Therapy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at Cl, ol. 1.
(psychotherapy and psychoanalytic diagnosis are still used to "enforce" gender norms
and brand as mentally ill those who do not conform). Elizabeth Abel sensibly concludes that: "It is better for feminism to challenge [psychoanalysis' resistance to 'the

1991] DIVORCE LAW, FEMINISM & PSYCHOANALYSIS

1501

key premise of psychoanalysis is that the child's early experiences of
intimacy establish the patterns (or "constructs") for those that follow. 85 These patterns are neither innate nor unalterable, but they
are unlikely to change until the adult recognizes them for what they
are. 86 Adult attitudes and behavior are shaped by the pre-rational,
pre-verbal desires of infancy and early childhood.
Feminist analysts have argued that the sex/gender system is
rooted in this internal landscape, or as Dorothy Dinnerstein described it, "that stubborn wordless level of adult feeling which is
continuous with infant feeling and with the emotional realm of early
childhood."' 87 The infant's and young child's relationship with his
or her mother is seen as a major, although certainty not the exclu9
sive, 88 source of gender constructs.8 As Gayle Rubin observed,
social'] than to renounce psychoanalysis entirely or succumb to its seductions." Abel,
Race, Class and Psychoanalysis? Opening Questions, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 184,
199 (M. Hirsch & E. Keller eds. 1990).
For a description of some of the schisms within psycho-feminism, see DISCONTENTED DISCOURSES, supra note 9, at 1; see also E. BARUCH & L. SERRANO, WOMEN
ANALYZE WOMEN (1988); Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence,95 YALE
L.J. 1373, 1389, 1392 (1986) (urging the law to recognize "psychological substructures
of gender" but criticizing Dinnerstein for looking at the "role of women from a patriarchally sanctioned place").
85. K. HORNEY, supra note 84, at 18 ("I regard as the most fundamental and most
significant of Freud's findings his doctrines that psychic processes are strictly determined, that actions and feelings may be determined by unconscious motivations and
that the motivations driving us are emotional forces"). An intrapsychic analysis focuses
on the individual's subconscious, as opposed to her actual relations with others. "[T]he
intrapsychic perspective conceives of the person as a discrete unit with a complex internal structure .... The crucial area we uncover with intrapsychic theory is the unconscious." J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68, at 20. The existence of the unconscious is
generally acknowledged today. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 329 & n.47.
86. This is a complex and difficult process. "[U]nconscious motivations remain
unconscious because we are interested in not becoming aware of them." K. HORNEY,
supra note 84, at 21 (emphasis added); accord, A GENERAL SELECTION FROM THE
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 11-12 (J. Rickman ed. 1957).
87.

D. DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGE-

MENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE 39 (1977). The idea of gender roles is as profoundly
ingrained in patriarchal culture as it is in the individual subconscious. See Foster, supra
note 69.
88. As Nancy Chodorow concludes, "[Ain open web of social, psychological, and
cultural relations, dynamics, practices, identities, beliefs, in which I would privilege
neither society, psyche, nor culture, comes to constitute gender as a social cultural and
psychological phenomenon." N. CHODOROW, supra note 9, at 5.
89. See J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68; N. CHODOROW, supra note 74, at 9; N.
CHODOROW, supra note 9; D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 87; J. MILLER, TOWARD A
NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMAN (1976); A. RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD

AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION (1976); Kahn, supra note 16. But see Dworkin,
Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE SIGNS READER 139, 146
(1980).
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"[P]sychoanalysis is a feminist theory manque." 9 Juliet Mitchell
was among the first to realize its significance for feminists: "Psychoanalysis explores the primary interrelationships between individual animals that make them human beings. By its very definition it
is an analysis of the most basic social formation-that which finds
its expression in the various forms of family . . . ."91 Perhaps poet
Adrienne Rich expressed it best: "motherhood is the great mesh in
which all human relations are entangled, in which lurk our most
elemental assumptions about love and power."'92 Women assume
responsibility for taking care of children, and men resist doing so,
not because female nurturing is innate, but because of the intrapsychic constructs 93 formed during our own infancies and childhoods, when we were cared for by mothers or other women.
This is obviously a very simplified fragment of a rich and com94
plex theory. While I do not claim any expertise in this area, it
90. Rubin, supra note 48, at 185. Edith Kurzweil has pointed out that in the
1970s, "French feminists, academics and intellectuals ... were thoroughly steeped in
...psychoanalysis." Kurzweil, The Uses of Psychoanalysis by Feminist Critics 4 (Feb.
18, 1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). See "notice" of the group
"politique et psychoanalyse" in THE NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS: AN ANTHOLOGY 32
(E. Marks & I. de Courtivron eds. 1981) [hereinafter NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS]. Described as the cultural and intellectual center of the "Mouvement de Liberation des
Femmes," this group "is committed to the exploration of woman's unconscious and the
radical subversion of society." The group said that its "grounds are in question by
analysis." Id. at 32. See also S. FREUD, THE HISTORY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC
MOVEMENT 65 (1967) (noting the lack of an early following in France); A. Jones, supra
note 15, at 247-49.
91. J. MITCHELL, WOMAN'S ESTATE 171 (1971); accord N. CHODOROW, supra
note 74, at 39 ("Psychoanalysis... provides a systematic, structural account of socialization and social reproduction."). See generally Flax, Mother-DaughterRelationships:
Psychodynamics, Politics and Philosophy in THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE 20, 22 (H.
Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds. 1980) (contributions of psychoanalysis to feminism, and of
feminism to psychoanalysis).
92. A. RICH, ON LIEs, SECRETS AND SILENCE 260 (1979). This is consistent with
Freud's description of society as structured by the Oedipal situation. S. FREUD, THE
INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF SIGMUND FREUD 307-309
(A. Brill ed. 1938); S. FREUD, THREE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF SEX, in
THE BASIC WRITINGS OF SIGMUND FREUD 617 & n.l, 618 (A. Brill ed. 1938); see also
S. FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS (1920); S.FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1930). See generally 0. MANNONI, FREUD (1971).
93. Intrapsychic constructs are simply internalized, subconscious patterns formed
by the infant/child's actual experience of intimacy. See supra notes 84-85.
94. In addition to the authorities cited supra notes 84-90, informative background
material may be found in J. GALLOP, THE DAUGHTER'S SEDUCTION: FEMINISM AND
PSYCHOANALYSIS (1982); E. KURZWEIL, THE FREUDIANS (1989); Gallop, Psychoanalysis in France, 7 WOMEN & LIT. 57-63 (1979). Those seeking a terse description of the
ways in which the French and American schools of feminist psychoanalytic theory differ should see J. ScoTT, supra note 2, at 37. For purposes of this Paper, which purports
to be no more than a preliminary inquiry, the differences in emphasis between the two
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seems to me that the work done by the psycho-feminists is invaluable for those of us seeking to "unpack" 95 divorce law. The next
section examines some of these analysts' fundamental insights and
their general relevance to divorce.
C.

Women as Mothers

Three major propositions that emerge from the work of the
psycho-feminists are particularly germane to divorce. All three derive from the core premise that in cultures where women are exclusively responsible for child rearing, women are generically perceived
and treated as mothers. 96 First, it has been suggested that women
internalize the values of the domestic sphere (which thereby become
"feminine" values);97 second, that women as well as men fear and
hate powerful women; and third, that the dynamics of dominance

and submission are gendered.
I will sketch these concepts and then explain how they illuminate two phenomena central to the debacle of French and American

divorce. The first is that women remain primarily responsible for
schools are far less important than their common "concern with the processes by which
the subject's identity is created... [and] focus on the early stages of child development
for clues to the formation of gender identity." Id.
95. See Copelan, supra note 64; Jones, supra note 15.
As Martha Fineman has argued, "The solutions to women's inequality will not be
found in the legal rules but in the cultural and social climate in which legal rules are
developed and used. It is there that women must continue to live and raise the children
after divorce." Fineman, Illusive Equality, supra note 79, at 785. But see infra text
accompanying notes 186-219 (challenging idea that women "must" do so).
96. Women are not, of course, considered exclusively as mothers. On the contrary,
as Simone de Beauvoir observed, women are cast in countless roles: "[Woman] is all
that man desires and all that he does not attain .... She is all, that is, on the plane of
the inessential; she is all the Other." S. DE BEAUVIOR, supra note 53, at 223. I simply
agree with the authorities cited above that infants' experience of their mothers affects
their later adult conceptions and expectations of women in general. See supra notes
84-94.
97. Anne Sexton has shown us that women may not only internalize but come to
embody these values:
Housewife
Some women marry houses.
It's another kind of skin; it has a heart,
a mouth, a liver and bowel movements.
The walls are permanent and pink.
See how she sits on her knees all day,
faithfully washing herself down.
Men enter by force, drawn back like Jonah
into their fleshy mothers.
A woman is her mother.
That's the main thing.
A. SEXTON, ALL MY PRETTY ONES 48 (1962).
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their children, 9 8 while men drift away from them, often remarrying
and starting new families. The second is that women usually have
grave financial problems after divorce, in part because they contribute far more to the support of the children (mainly in terms of time
but often in monetary terms as well) and in part because of discrimination in the marketplace.
1. The Private Sphere
The ancient idea of separate spheres for men and women99 received fresh impetus from the advent of capitalism, when the means
of production were transferred from the self-sustaining farm to the
owner's premises.lc ° Men went to work in the factories. 0 1 Women, most of whom remained at home with the children, assumed
primary responsibility for the household. 10 2 The dichotomy between the domestic sphere and the public, civil world remains pro98. In the United States, ninety percent of the children in single-parent families live
with their mothers. WOMEN As SINGLE PARENTS: CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL
BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE WORKPLACE, AND THE HOUSING MARKET 3 (E. Mulroy ed. 1988) [hereinafter WOMEN As SINGLE PARENTS].
99. Rifkin, supra note 52, at 91 & n.53 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS). As Virginia
Held has noted, "a long line of thinkers [including Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Levi-Strauss,
Arendt] have associated the 'public' sphere with the distinctively human, the 'private'
with the natural[,]... the family as focused on particularistic and hence inferior concerns, often in conflict with the superior and more universal concerns of the 'public'
sphere." Held, Birth and Death, 99 ETHICS 362, 377 (1989). The classic formulation of
separate sphere ideology in American jurisprudence appears in Justice Bradley's infamous concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139-41 (1872); cf. Z.
EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY 97 (1984); Katzenstein, Comparing
the Feminist Movements of the US. and Western Europe: An Overview, in WOMEN'S
MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 3, 17 n.6 (placing "public" and "private" in quotations,
"because they are, and should be, distinctions under challenge.").
100. Rifkin, supra note 52, at 92-95. The public/private sphere dichotomy also refers to the distinction between the domain of the state and that of private individuals.
The latter would include private business as well as private family life. See generally
Olsen, Family and Market, supra note 8; cf. Omolade, Black Women and Feminism, in
THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 91, at 247, 248-50 (noting that the foregoing
analysis does not apply to black women in tribal society).
101. Rifkin, supra note 52, at 92-93 (explaining that women were excluded from
working in trades by law and by the internal regulations promulgated by the guilds).
For a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the history of women's work in France
and England, see L. TILLY & J. W. SCOTT,supra note 54, at 6-8 (reassessing the idea
that capitalism precipitated a "sharp break in women's experience from the household
to the workplace").
102. See Pateman, Feminist Critiquesof the Public/PrivateDichotomy, in THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 286 (S.Benn & G. Gaus eds. 1983). Juliet
Mitchell has suggested that women were "kept out of the labor force not because they
were physically weak but because they were needed in the family to please men sexually,

1991] DIVORCE LAW,FEMINISM & PSYCHOANALYSIS 1505
foundly gendered even though American and French women have
entered the labor force in unprecedented numbers.103
Instead of eradicating gender differences, the stereotyped division of labor is duplicated in the marketplace.°4 Although women
have attained higher representation in some occupations, there remains a disproportionate concentration of women in certain fieldse.g., clerical, nursing, child care-that pay far less than comparable
jobs in fields which are dominated by men. 10 5 Moreover, notwithstanding their work outside the home, American women still do
to bear children, and to socialize them." E. KURZWEIL,, supra note 94, at 161. See
generally Chused, Gendered Space, 42 FLA. L. REV. 125 (1990).
Some women, of course, joined the industrial labor force. See, e.g. THE LOWELL
OFFERING: WRITINGS BY NEW ENGLAND MILL WOMEN (1840-1845) (B. Eisler ed.
1977); Minow, supra note 11, at 869-77. As Bell Hooks reminds us, black women in
the U.S. have always worked outside their own homes, "in the fields, in the factories, in
the laundries, in the homes of others." B. HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN
TO CENTER 133 (1984). They still assumed responsibility for traditional "wifely" duties. Scales-Trent, supra note 45, at 28. See generally K. MARX, GERMAN IDEOLOGY,
excerpted in E. FROMM, MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN 205-56 (1976) (describing the division of labor within the family unit).
103. The increase in workforce participation by women is part of a clear long term
economic trend. V. FUCHS, How WE LIVE 127 (1983) (noting that, except for a temporary spurt during World War II, America's female labor force participation increased
since 1890 at the rate of approximately 3 percentage points per decade until 1950, and
since 1950 at the unprecedented rate of 9 percentage points per decade). But see
Uchitelle, Women's Push Into Work Force Seems to Have Peakedfor Now, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 24, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (citing weak economy and higher birth rate).
In France, women have comprised an increasing percentage of the labor force in
recent years, climbing from 34.3% of the labor force in 1962 (compared to 33.8% in the
U.S.) to 42.4% in 1984 (compared to 43.4% in the U.S.). D. STETSON, supra note 32,
at 130. See generally id. at 129-59. The largest area of new jobs for French women has
been in white-collar clerical jobs. L. TILLY & J.W.SCOTT, supra note 54, at 215.
104. See generally A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGEEARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982); J. MATTHAEI, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA: WOMEN'S WORK, THE SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOR,
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM (1982).

105. Of 44 million working women in the U.S. in 1985, approximately 80% were
employed in the service industry. In 1982, health services ranked second in the proportion of women workers, 36th in average hourly wages. NOW-NJ NEWSBREAKS, July
1987, at 3 (reprinted from AFL-CIO News citing study by Professor Karen Brodkin
Sacks); Madden, The Persistenceof Pay Differentials: The Economics of Sex Discrimination, in I WOMEN AND WORK: AN ANNUAL REVIEW 76 (L. Larwood, A. Stromberg &
B. Gutekim eds. 1985) [hereinafter WOMEN AND WORK]. But see The Job Market
Opens Upfor the 68-Cent Woman, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1987, at E6, col. 4.
Professors Tilly and Scott have pointed out that the "baby boom" in France,
although less dramatic than that in the U.S., contributed to "an expansion of the tertiary sector and thus to the demand for female workers. More nurses and teachers were
" L.
needed, for example, to care for increasingly large numbers of young children ....
TILLY & J.W. SCOTT, supra note 54, at 217.
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most of the necessary work within the home as well.106 This division of labor is for the most part even sharper in France. 107
At the core of the notion of separate spheres is the idde fixe
that taking care of other people, especially children, is women's real
work.108 As Chodorow points out, this is a self-perpetuating
system:
Because of their child-care responsibilities, women's primary social location is domestic.... Men's location in the public sphere,
then, defines society itself as masculine. It gives men power to
create and enforce institutions of social and political control, important among these to control marriage as an institution that
both expresses men's rights in women's sexual and reproductive
capacities and reinforces these rights. t1 9
Children soon learn to distinguish the gendered spheres of influence
and activity inhabited by the adult men and women in their homes,
in their day care centers and schools, in the television programs
they watch, and the stories they are told. They quickly realize their
own position in a gendered system. Gayle Rubin's paraphrase of
Lacan neatly describes the process, "In Lacan's scheme, the Oedipal crisis occurs when a child learns of the sexual rules embedded in
the terms for family and relatives. The crisis begins when the child
comprehends the System and his or her place in it; the crisis is resolved when the child accedes to it."'10
106. See E. BADINTER, MOTHER LOVE: MYTH AND REALITY 303, 308 (1980); BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, Ser. P.23, No. 146, at 7 (1986) (noting that "most working women meet the usual
demands of housework and family care in addition to their work in the labor force"); D.
STETSON, supra note 32, at 138-39 (France); Kulzer, Law and the Housewife: Property,
Divorce and Death, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1975); Ms., Feb. 1988, at 19 (citing B. F.
Kiker, data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics conducted by Survey Research
Center, Institute for Social Research, U. Mich.); infra notes 191 & 194.
107. See Silver, supra note 3, at 77.
108. For development of the proposition that "maternal power in the nursery defines gender so'as to foster patriarchal power in the public world," see Kahn, supra note
16, at 75; see generally BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 106, at 7 (noting that
"[m]any [working women] choose work that will fit around... their family responsibilities, a complication and impediment to occupational advancement not faced by most
men").
109. N. CHODOROW, supra note 74 at 9; cf. N. NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE
APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 128 (1984) (suggesting a biological
and material basis for mothering). Chodorow has been criticized by psychoanalyst and
historian Peter Loewenberg, among others, for "ignoring biological reality." E.
KURZWEIL, supra note 94, at 172. But see supra notes 74-76.
110. Rubin, supra note 48, at 188-89; see L. COTTIN POGREBIN, GROWING UP
FREE: RAISING NON-SEXIST CHILDREN (1980); Ayim & Houston, A ConceptualAnalysis of Sexism and Sexist Education, in PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES 145 (D. Cochrane & M. Shiral eds. 1982); Bem, Gender Schema Theory and
its Implicationsfor Child Development: Raising Gender-Aschematic Children in a Gen-
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Women's relegation to the private sphere has readily apparent
implications in the context of divorce.1 1 Because she is responsible
for maintaining harmony in the home, she is blamed when the marriage fails. Whether she initiates the divorce, or is merely unable to2
prevent her husband from doing so, it is presumably her failure."
Another consequence of the separate sphere dichotomy is that
divorced women are less likely than men to remarry. The woman
does not need a man to have a home since she creates and maintains
the domestic sphere. She is self-sufficient in this regard and remarriage does not have the same urgency for her that it does for a
man. 1 3 Furthermore, since she usually seeks, and is granted, custody of the children, she does not need to remarry to have a family.
This is just as well because it is usually mote difficult for her to find
a second husband than for a man to find a second wife. As a practical matter, a second husband is more likely than a second wife to

find himself contributing to the support of the children of the first
marriage."14 Perhaps more significant, he has to compete with his
step children for their mother's love and attention.
What the divorced woman does need, of course, is money. Her
niche is in the domestic sphere; she is regarded as an interloper in
the public sphere. She is likely to find herself restricted to the "pink
5
collar ghetto" of the service industry, clerical or nursing work"
where that perception, and her compensation, will be less. Her conder-Schematic Society, 8 SIGNS 598 (Summer 1982); Mussen, Early Sex Role Development, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH (D. Goslin ed.
1969).
111. See generally Olsen, Family and Market, supra note 8, at 1499-1500 (discussing the glorification of the private sphere).
112. Fault grounds for divorce, under which women's entitlement to alimony is contingent upon establishing the "fault" of the husband, in part serve as a device for overcoming this presumption. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 16-17.
113. See A. SEXTON, supra note 97; Wallerstein, supra note 44. Both former
spouses may have other reasons to marry again. As Chodorow observes, the need to be
in relationships may be at least as important a motivation as innate aggression and
sexuality. N. CHODOROW, supra note 9, at 114-53.
114. D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT (1979) excerpted in READINGS IN FAMILY LAW: DIVORCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 107, 109 (F. Lombard ed. 1990) [hereinafter LOMBARD]. Legally, the trend is
toward gender neutral suport duties. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the
Stepparent-ChildRelationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 41 (1984).
115. See L. TILLY & J.W. SCOTT, supra note 54, at 2, 3; Taub, Keeping Women in
Their Place. Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L.
REV. 345, 349 (1980) (suggesting that "attitudinal factors figure significantly on both
the supply and demand sides of the picture"); supra note 105. See generally Gilder,
Women in the Work Force, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1986, at 20.
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tinuing child care and homemaking responsibilities, 1 6 moreover,
weaken her attachment to the labor force.1 1 7 Both the prevalent
depreciation of women's work 18 and this weak labor force attachment result in economic dependence on former husbands or the
state.
2.

The All-Powerful Mother

Women's role as caregivers is critical to the development of
children's attitudes toward gender. Dorothy Dinnerstein has argued that the infant's relationship with her mother effectively establishes the basic terms in which that infant, and all mother-reared
children, view women. 1 9 A mother-reared culture subconsciously
sees women from the distorted, dependent, pre-rational perspective
of the infant. The perception of woman-as-mother affects the ways
in which the parties behave toward each other during the divorce
process, how they are dealt with by the decisionmaker, and how
they are treated by the law itself.
Because of the equation of "women" with "mothers," men and
women who are the products of exclusive female parenting (until
recently the ideal in France and America) 120 tend to hate and fear
powerful women. In a mother-reared society, Dinnerstein explains,
powerful women too vividly evoke the "helplessness of infancy," for
women as well as men:
The crucial psychological fact is that all of us, female as well
as male, fear the will of women. Man's dominion over what we
116. Increased labor force participation of married mothers of young children has
been especially dramatic. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 106, at 8. Sixty-two

percent of all mothers of school age children were in the labor force in 1980. American
Women, supra note 45, at 2. By 1986, most mothers (72%) who worked were employed
full-time. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 100TH CONG., IST SEss., DATA
AND MATERIALS RELATED TO WELFARE PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN

159 (Comm. Print 1987).
117. Weak labor force attachment refers to a work history characterized by parttime work, seasonal work, or work interrupted by sometimes lengthy periods of childcare. See WOMEN AND WORK, supra note 105.
118. See Taub, From ParentalLeaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 381, 404-5 (1984-85).

119. D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 28-34; see also Burke, Re-thinking the Maternal, in THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 91, at 107-14 (predicating theory

of female difference on motherhood, and comparing American and French feminist
readings of Freud).
120. See generally E. BADINTER, supra note 106; Myth and Reality, in S. DE
BEAVOIR, supra note 53, at 540-88; B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
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think of as the world rests on a terror that we all feel: the
terror
121
of sinking back wholly into the helplessness of infancy.
Abandonment by a wife can hardly be compared to abandonment by a husband in either the United States or France. The husband who leaves his wife and family is viewed as an irresponsible
child; he is "running away" or "cheating". The wife who leaves her
family-and this is not uncommon in both the United States and
France as women attain greater economic autonomy 22 isviewed
in an entirely different light. She is the psychological equivalent of
the mother who abandons; she is a monster. 123 Even if she desperately seeks custody of her children, ironically, to her husband and
her community she is still a rejecting mother.
This has a direct impact on the terms of the divorce because
the former husband, notwithstanding his economic self-sufficiency,
is perceived as vulnerable and needy. The image of the literally
"helpless" single man is ubiquitous in France as well as in the
United States. 124 He simply cannot manage the daily tasks stereotypically done by women. He cannot cook, clean, organize a
household or take care of a child. Indeed, he needs someone to take
care of him. 125 This also explains, in part, both the far higher re121. D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 161 (emphasis in original); accord N.
CHODOROW, supra note 74, at 181 ("mothers represent regression and lack of
autonomy").
122. See infra note 149. Carolyn Heilbrun has suggested that, "The real tension...
between the fleeing woman and those who struggle to preserve the family, is the tension
between order and change .... It is most evident within marriage, where the man
desires order and the woman change." C. HEILBRUN, supra note 3, at 178.
123. Freud considered the wife's assumption of a maternal role essential to a "secure" marriage: "[A] marriage is not made secure until the wife has succeeded in making her husband her child as well and in acting as a mother to him." Gallop, supra note
69, at 37 (citing S. FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES 133-34 (1964)). Gallop
notes that according to Irigaray's reading of Freud, it is "woman's destiny ... to become her husband's mother." Id.; cf.Sheppard, Unspoken Premises in Custody Litigation, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 229, 232-33 (1982) (noting that mothers who "take
[their] place in the larger community" as workers may so affront decisionmakers as to
jeopardize their claims to custody).
124. In the popular French and American versions of the movie Three Men and a
Baby (Touchstone Pictures, 1987), the heroes begin to appreciate the value of nurturing
work and to acquire some basic skills. It still takes three of them to do the work of one
woman.

125. C. HEILRRUN, supra note 3, at 172 ("In fact, who Norm is, who all the husbands are, is clear: those who need someone to take care of their domestic, cooking,
cleaning, sexual, breeding needs while they are out attending to civilization and their
own appreciation of life.") (discussing M. FRENCH,' THE WOMEN'S ROOM). See B.
HOOKS, supra note 102, at 103; THE POLITICS OF HOUSEWORK (E. Molos ed. 1982).
Male incompetence is generally portrayed humorously, since it is made clear that the
man is fully capable in the public sphere, the sphere that matters. Rather than master
these tasks, he is expected to find some woman to do them for him.
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marriage rates for men than women, 126 and why sequential monogamy is condoned for men while it is barely tolerated for women.
Under Dinnerstein's analysis, sequential monogamy for women may be disfavored because sharing the "mother" is as intolerable to us as adults as it was to us as infants. 127 For almost 70 years
there was no legal divorce in France under the Napoleonic code,
which "entrapped woman in the institution of marriage, where her
only right was the duty to obey her husband."' 128 This did not deter
men, nor was it intended to, from extramarital liaisons. Even today, French divorce law prohibits a woman from remarrying within
300 days of the divorce decree.'2 9
In the United States, support is frequently terminated, often
with the court's approval, upon the former wife's cohabitation. 130
This is justified by the notion that the cohabitor is contributing to
her support, or that the former husband is in effect subsidizing her
126. In the U.S., "[i]n the 25-44 age range, the remarriage rate of divorced men is
almost double that of divorced women." Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief
Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations,7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
235, 241 n.51. (1982). The belief that men need women to take care of them may be
well-founded. Statistically, married men are healthier and live longer than single men,
the opposite being true for women. B. EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN: AMERICAN DREAMS AND THE FLIGHT FROM COMMITMENT 10 (1983) (citing J. BERNARD,
THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 18 (1972)); accord, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at A15, col.

5 (citing study by researchers at University of California at San Francisco which found
that men between the age of 45 and 64 who live alone or with a person other than a wife
are twice as likely to die within 10 years as men who live with their wives).
127. As Luce Irigaray has noted, "Mythology long ago assigned this [virgin mother]
role to her in which she is allowed a certain social power as long as she is reduced, with
her own complicity, to sexual impotence." Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, in
NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS, supra note 90, at 99, 104. Compare this with Julie Kris-

teva's suggestion that patriarchal culture harshly represses "Ia mere qui jouit" ("the
mother who has sexual pleasure"). Id. at 38. See generally Dunlap, Toward Recognition of "A Right to Be Sexual," 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 245 (1982) (differences in
judicial attitudes toward sexuality of women and men). Sequential monogomy for women may also be disfavored, of course, because it can give rise to questions about paternity. See sources cited supra note 64.
128. D. STETSON, supra note 32, at 30; see also NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS, supra

note 90, at 17.
129. Glendon, supra note 34, at 225. The intent, Glendon suggests, is to avoid "confusion of paternity."
130. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (West Supp. 1990) (cohabition with person
of opposite sex gives rise to rebuttable presumption of decreased support needs). Compare Berg v. Berg, 116 R.I. 607, 611, 359 A. 2d 354, 356 (1976) ("It is recognized in
Rhode Island and many other jurisdictions that the expenses incurred by a divorced
father's remarriage may be considered in determining whether child support payments
should be reduced, terminated, or increased.") with State ex rel. New York v. Hasbun,
27 Or. App. 423, 426, 556 P.2d 166, 167 (1976) (presumption that divorced father "had
in mind his obligation to his children by the first marriage when he assumed the further
obligations of his second marriage.").
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new lover. But there may also be a punitive element.
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from man to man; she may only be passed among them.
for example, may be "given away" by her father to her husband.
When the woman does the choosing, without even symbolic defer132
ence to male authority, she risks being stigmatized or worse.

3. Submission and Domination
Women's role as primary caregivers establishes the terms for
the relationships at the heart of the sex/gender system. The American psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin has brilliantly described the
process in her book, The Bonds of Love. 13 3 In essence, boys realize
their identity through the repudiation of their mothers, who passively accept rejection. Girls have no similar opportunity for renunciation because, for them, mothers are the role models whose
passivity they learn to emulate. As a result, patterns of male domination and female subordination are learned by children at an early
age.
Like Dinnerstein and Chodorow, Benjamin traces much of our
gendered behavior to exclusive female parenting. She breaks new
theoretical ground, however, with her discussion of "intersubjectivity," which has its origins in Jurgen Habermas' social theory.
Habermas uses the term "intersubjectivity of mutual understanding" to refer to both the individual's capacity to recognize another
as separate and autonomous and the social domain created by that
mutual recognition.134 "Intersubjectivity" refers to "what happens
in the field of self and other." 135 This approach enables Benjamin
to focus on the child's acquisition of relatedness skills as well as her
36
acquisition of autonomy. 1
131. See Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revis-

ited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 116 (1978).
132. Rubin, supra note 48, at 206-207; see also Shrage, Should Feminists Oppose
Prostitution?,99 ETHICS 347 (1989).
133. J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68.
134. Id. at 19 n.*.
135. Id. at 20; see K. HORNEY, supra note 84, at 9; cf. M. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 1, at 297 (arguing that family laws in the
United States and Western Europe suggest that "dependency is somehow degrading,
and implicitly deny .. .the importance of human intersubjectivity").

136. Compare with Gilligan's criticism of Kohlberg's theory of moral development.
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 24-63 (1982). But see J. ScoTT, supra note 2, at 40 (criticizing Gilligan's

C.

formulations as "ahistorical, defining woman/man as a universal, self-reproducing bi-
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Benjamin finds her paradigm in Hegel's description of domination; the paradox that "at the very moment of realizing our own
137
independence, we are dependent upon another to recognize it.'
She suggests that children of both sexes confront this paradox when
they realize that the primary love object must be renounced and
that they must separate from their caretaker. According to Benjamin, the male and female patterns of domination and submission
originate in and replicate the separation of each from the original
caretaker, who is almost always a woman in France and America:
"Male children achieve their masculinity by denying their original
identification or oneness with their mothers.... The premise of [the
boy's] independence is to say 'I am nothing like she who cares for
Benjamin argues that the female-mother's experience
me.' "
complements the male-child's. Just as he refuses to recognize her,
she accepts being objectified, and is willing to recognize him anyway. "The classic maternal ideal of motherhood-a paragon of
self-abnegation-is only a beautification of [the woman's lack of
139
subjectivity]."'
Central to Benjamin's thesis is the idea that the mother is a
"subject whose independent center must be outside her child if she
is to grant him the recognition he seeks."I 40 She attributes women's
submissiveness to both their identification with their mothers and
their mothers' lack of subjectivity. Since the mother is the daughnary opposition"); see also On In a Different Voice: An InterdisciplinaryForum, 11
SIGNS 304 (1986).

Benjamin uses intersubjectivity to criticize the intrapsychic bias of psychoanalysis,
but she stresses it as complementary, rather than in opposition, to the intrapsychic
model. J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68, at 10, 19.
137. J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68, at 33; see also Minow, supra note 4, at 74 & n.294.
138. J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68, at 75-76; accord N. CHODOROW, supra note 9, at
49; C. HEILBRUN, supra note 3, at 192. In Hegel's notions of "absoluteness... and
alone[ness] ('There is nothing outside of me that I do not control')," Benjamin finds the
basis for domination and the master-slave relationship. J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68, at
33; see also Kristeva, Matidre, sens, dialectique, 44 TEL QUEL, Winter 1971, at 17-34
(reconsideration of Hegel's dialectical materialsim, using a linguistic/ psychoanalytic
framework) (cited in V. THORNDIKE HULES, FRENCH FEMINIST CRITICISM: WOMEN,
LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE (1982)).
139. J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68, at 78. Gilligan refers to this as the second of "two
equations that have prevailed and have formed a self-enclosed system. The first is the
equation of human with male.... The second equation, which has sustained the first, is
the equation of virtue for women, or caring by women, with self-sacrifice." DuBois,
Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon & Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values
and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 45-46 (1985) [hereinafter
Mitchell Lecture].
140. J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68, at 24. See generally J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE
OF MOTHERHOOD (1974).
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ter's "mainstay of identity," the daughter fails to distinguish herself
from her mother and "becomes unable to distinguish what she
wants from what mother wants." 1 4 1 This would not necessarily
lead to submission if the mother were a subject. As Benjamin ex-

plains, however, "[t]o the extent that the mother has sacrificed her
own independence, the girl's attempt at independence would represent an assertion of power for which she has no basis in
42
identification."1
The dynamic of dominance and submission described by Benjamin has serious and clearly observable consequences during the
process of divorce. First, mother-reared cultures, like those of

France and America, adamantly refuse to recognize women as subjects. 143 Thus, the real focus of the law, as well as the court, is more
45
44
likely to be on the husband's "rights"' or the children's welfare,1
than on the woman's needs' 46 at divorce. Second, the archetype of
male domination is reinforced at every phase of the divorce process,
whether the woman is being bullied by her ex-husband, patronized
by her typically male lawyer, or having her fate decided by what
will almost certainly be a male judge. '4 7 Third, under Benjamin's

analysis, the woman is likely to collaborate unconsciously in both
141. J. BENJAMIN, supra note 68, at 79.
142. Id.; accord N. CHODOROW, supra note 9, at 65 ("[G]irls [need to grow up]
around women who, in addition to their child-care responsibilities, have a valued role
and recognized spheres of control"); cf. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wisc. WOMEN'S L.J.
81, 85 (1987) (suggesting that women "trivialize" their own suffering because "[a]n injury uniquely sustained by a disempowered group will lack a name, a history, and in
general a linguistic reality").
143. For descriptions of married women's lack of "subjectivity" see, e.g., C. HEILBRUN, supra note 3, at 175; Silver, supra note 3, at 81 (during debates in the French
Assembly after World War I, it was argued that married women should not be enfranchised because they "could not be 'political individuals' with wills other than those
of their husbands").
144. See, e.g., Urviller, Father's Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption
Revisited, I HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107 (1978) (describing men's increasing assertion of
custody rights); see also Molinoff, Life with Father: How Men are Winning Custody of
their Kids, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 13.
145. I am not suggesting that children's welfare is in any sense adequately addressed
at divorce, merely that courts and legislatures are more likely to focus on it, at least
rhetorically. See, e.g., S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, WHAT'S HAPPENING TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY? (1981); Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to
Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986); infra note 215.
146. It has been suggested that a rights paradigm, as opposed to a needs paradigm,
itself precludes or trivializes consideration of women's needs. See authorities cited infra
notes 238-242. The point here is that the refusal to recognize women as subjects is
consistent with a pinched construction of their rights.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 178-182.
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by the men, or the
the denial of her subjectivity and her domination
"male" institutions, involved in the process. 48
III. TOWARD A PSYCHO-FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF DIVORCE LAW
The preceding section explains why intrapsychic constructsgendered in accordance with a pattern of infant and child care provided almost exclusively by women-play a significant, if indeterminate, part in how we perceive and treat divorce. Divorce, especially
women-initiated divorce, 149 means that the woman has failed at her
primary function of maintaining harmony in the domestic sphere.
Since the destruction of the private sphere is her fault, she should
bear the consequences. Even more grievous, from the husband's
(male) perspective, divorce means that woman-as-mother is gone.
Regardless of actual fault, she is perceived as an abandoning
mother, whose appalling desertion of her husband-child should be
punished. The notion of woman-as-mother also underlies our expectation and condonation of sequential marriages by men and our
corresponding discouragement of multiple families by women.
Moreover, deeply ingrained patterns of domination and submission
facilitate men's imposition of- and women's capitulation to- male
values, standards and interests.
This section explores the impact of the intrapsychic constructs
described above -on specific aspects of both the divorce process and
its aftermath. It should be emphasized that here, as in the preceding section, I do not mean to suggest that the patterns described are
universal, or that they necessarily manifest themselves as grossly as
I have outlined. Rather, enough of these patterns are observable,
with enough clarity, enough of the time not only0 to justify their
recognition, but to mandate a systemic response.15
148. Cf. Resnik, supra note 4, at 4 ("One of the central aspects of feminism is an
understanding that much of the activity in women's lives is directed toward seeking
approval, permission, power and legitimation from men.")
149. In France, as of 1984, "[s]ixty percent of the petitions are brought by only one
spouse: three of four times it will be the wife." D. STETSON, supra note 32, at 92;
accord STATISTIQUE ANNUELLE, supra note 1, at 49 ("L'initiative du divorce: surtout
f6minine"). In the U.S., women filed 61.5% of the divorce petitions acted on in 1986,
men filed 32.6% of the petitions, and 5.9% were jointly filed. New Data on Divorce
Filing, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1989, at C8, col. 3. In Wallerstein's study, 65% of the
women (compared to 35% of the men) had sought divorce over the objection of their
spouses. Wallerstein, supra note 44, at 68. As Nadine Taub has pointed out, some of
these petitions may be attributable to the chivalrous custom of allowing the wife to file
first. N. Taub, Comment on July 17, 1989 draft of this Article.
150. My purpose here is not to suggest specific proposals for reform, but to demonstrate the need for judges, lawyers and spouses, who are involved in the divorce process,
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Implicationsfor the Divorce Process

1. Negotiation and Mediation
Negotiation and mediation are methods through which parties
resolve disputes without formal adjudication. 151 In negotiation, the
parties attempt to do so by themselves. 152 In mediation, they have
the assistance of a third party. 15 3 In France, although negotiation
between the parties plays a central role in most divorces, the parties
return to court several times before the divorce is granted. The process through which they agree to the terms of support, visitation
and property distribution is generally subject to more formal super15 4
vision than it is in the United States.
In the U.S., as in France, almost all divorces are resolved
through negotiation and/or mediation.15 5 Professor Frank Sander
has succinctly summed up the advantages of an "open-ended, problem solving process that looks to the future; .... [that is] flexible...
crafted by the parties themselves ...[and] avoids the winner-loser
syndrome .... [D]isputants ...have a strong commitment to the
result that is reached. ' 1 56
to be aware of these intrapsychic patterns. Only then can we begin to devise appropriate ways to deal with them. Specific proposals would be premature.
151.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE

RESOLUTION (1982).
152. See, e.g., Melli, Erlanger & Chambliss, The Processof Negotiation:An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133 (1988).
153. "Rooted in African moots, socialist comrades' courts, psychotherapy and labor
mediation rather than Anglo-American jurisprudence, mediation stresses informality,
open and direct communication, reinforcement of'positive bonds and avoidance of
blame." Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes: A Longitudinal Evaluation, in LOMBARD, supra note .114, at 171; see, e.g., R. FISHER & W. URY,
GETTING TO YES (1981); Cornblatt, Legal Essay: MatrimonialMediation, 23 J. FAM.
L. 99 (1984-85); Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation,
16 FAM. L.Q. 107 (1982).
154. Peigne, FinancialArrangements on Divorce in France, in THE RESOLUTION OF
FAMILY CONFLICT, supra note 25, at 322, 324-25 (describing the judge's responsibilities); accord M. GLENDON, supra note 21, at 85.
155. No official count is kept of mediated divorces, but by 1988 approximately 120
programs were operating in the U.S. and some states have made it mandatory, at least
in the first instance. Brannigan, Warring Couples Shun Divorce Mediators and Opt Instead to Battle it Out in Court, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, at Bl, col. 4. Mediation is
mandatory, for example, in contested cases involving custody or visitation in California.
CAL. CIV. CODE. § 4607 (West Supp. 1990). For a systematic exploration of the consequences of using mediation in the context of custody and visitation, see Pearson &
Thoennes, supra note 153. See also White, Mediation in Child Custody Disputes and a
Look at Louisiana, 50 LA. L. REV. 1111 (1990).
156. Sander, Introduction:Towards a FunctionalAnalysis of Family Process, in THE
RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT, supra note 25, at xi, xiii; see also Brotsky, Steinman & Zemmelman, Joint Custody Through Mediation-Reviewed, 26 CONCILIATION
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To the extent that the law itself is "male," representing and
incorporating male values, 157 negotiation may permit women to
avoid or minimize the official imposition of those values. James
Foster has suggested, for example, that "the quintessential male
world of law [is] profoundly shaped by the formal-rational, contractarian ...underpinnings of American social reality, and... by
the psycho-sexual roots of patriarchy." '1 58 Since compliance is generally greater with an agreement the parties have devised themselves, enforcement, and the legal machinery it involves, is likely to
be less of a problem. 159 Similarly, negotiation may allow women to
limit the utilization of the adversarial, reductionist methodsteo
which infuse legal culture.
Finally, negotiation not only allows but encourages consideration of the parties' concerns, including those too personal or idiosyncratic to be found on a legal checklist. Its adherents claim it
affords women a greater opportunity for the full expression of their
needs.161 Women in both France and the U.S. have opted for negotiation or mediation over litigation.162 Carol Gilligan, among
others, has suggested that women are more skilled at and more
16 3
comfortable with negotiation than they are with outright conflict.
But while women may be more comfortable with these constructs
CT.REV., Dec. 1988, at 53, 58 (concluding that "j]oint custody appears to be working
out well for these families and their children who had needed considerable assistance to
work out an agreement"). See generally Hobbs, FacilitativeEthics in Divorce Mediation:
A Law and Process Approach, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 325 (1988).
157. See supra notes 69 & 78. As Robin West has pointed out, autonomy, independence, and separation are liberal as well as "male" values. West, supra note 10, at 4-7.
158. Foster, supra note 69.
159. Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 487 (1985); accord Pearson
& Thoennes, supra note 153, at 177.
160. Some feminists have argued that these are "male" methods. Foster, supra note
69; Rifkin, supra note 52. Many believe that the law is "inherently patriarchal." Olsen,
supra note 10, at 5 & n.13; supra note 58. See generally Olsen, Feminist Theory in
Grand Style, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1170 (1989) (reviewing C. MACKINNON, FEMI-

NISM UNMODIFIED (1987)) (grand theory criticized for "suppress[ing] the complexity
and ambiguities of life in order to fit lived experiences into these tidy categories.").
161. See Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotiation: Can Good Advocates
be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. REV. 863, 873 (1987) (describing the "messy richness" of the context cultivated by the "wise negotiator").
162. For a thought-provoking study of the ways in which such choices may be
shaped, see Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 93, 109-16 (1986).
163. See generally C. GILLIGAN, supra note 136; Rifkin, Mediationfrom a Feminist
Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 21 (1984). But see MacKinnon, infra note 165.
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than they are with a more formal legalistic process, 164 they do not
165
always benefit from these methods.
Reducing the law's role in the process leaves more to be deter66
mined by the gendered intrapsychic constructs described above.'
Gendered dynamics of domination and submission are almost inevitable at divorce, when the context reinforces gendered identities
such as "wife/husband" and "mother/father."' 1 67 Because of their
usually accurate perception of their relative lack of power, and what
are often for them intolerably high stakes, women are typically
more "risk-adverse" during the divorce process than men particularly when custody is involved. 168 This makes women not only
more inclined to choose negotiation, but more likely to capitulate
within its framework. 169 Most women will freely bargain away support and property, for example, in exchange for greater control over
custody and visitation. 170 Moreover, while private ordering may facilitate richer discussion, it impedes the recognition of gendered
constructs as such. Indeed, as a "private" process, it encourages the
parties to see themselves more as individuals than as members of
subordinate or dominant groups. Since there is no precedential
value to settlements, one woman's successful articulation of her
concerns does little for the next woman. Negotiation does not pur164. It has been pointed out that "[m]ediation generates a great deal of user satisfaction." Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 153, at 172.
165. See Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION, supra note 64, at 56, 61 ("[T]his failure of
rights discourse does not logically mean that informal systems will lead to better outcomes."). MacKinnon has remarked that "it makes a lot of sense that [women] should
want to negotiate, since we lose conflicts." Mitchell Lecture, supra note 139, at 27. In
the divorce context, women "lose" negotiations as well.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 96-148.
167. See Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal
Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984); Woods, Mediation:A
Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431
(1985). See generally Scanzoni, A HistoricalPrespective on Husband-Wife Bargaining
Power and MaritalDissolution, in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION 20, 31 (G. Levinger & 0.
Moles eds. 1979). But cf Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 993 (1979) ("There may well be cases in
which one spouse (stereotypically the husband) is highly sophisticated in business matters, while the other spouse is an innocent lamb being led to the slaughter. But married
couples more typically have similar educational and cultural backgrounds, and most
individuals perceive very well their own financial interests and needs at the time of
divorce.").
168. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 311-312.
169. Women in the Courts, supra note 47, at 169-70 (referring to "concern that the
woman litigant was more susceptible to intimidation in the mediation process than was
the male litigant").
170. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 243 n.82 (quoting Nancy Polikofi).
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port to establish, and may even inhibit the development of any
mechanism for establishing, normative weight for such concerns. 171
Although in some cases negotiation may be constructive, from a
psycho-feminist perspective it poses significant risks.
2.

Judicial Discretion

If the parties are unable to resolve their differences, the task
falls to the court. Judges have tremendous discretion in divorce
cases in both France and the United States. In French divorce-convention (divorce upon the joint petition of the spouses), for example,
even approval of a settlement to which the parties agree may be
withheld under provisions which "give the judge so much discretion
...that [he] can in effect force the parties to adopt an agreement of
which he is indirectly the author." 172 The juge aux affaires matrimoniales (J.A.M.)
intervenes at all stages .... For divorce by consent, in particular, he assumes the whole procedure. He hears the parties, first
alone and then with their advocates, at least twice, and he pronounces the final decision of which he alone is sole judge.... [h]e
future he should amend certain provialone decides when in the
173
sions of the judgment.
Similarly, American matrimonial judges have broad equitable powers and commensurate leeway.
The point of this extraordinary discretion is to permit the court
to take into account all aspects of the marital situation in order to
reach a fair decision. 174 It represents a deliberate focus on the context of the dispute175and an attempt to compensate for the lack of
"messy richness"' in the legal system, and what some feminists
have criticized as its failure to recognize women's own perceptions
171. See Schafran, The Success of the American Program, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY 41 (S. Martin & K. Mahoney eds. 1986).
172. Glendon, supra note 34, at 205.
173. Peigne, supra note 154, at 325; see also STATISTIQUE ANNUELLE supra note 1,
at 51 ("Intervention du juge apr~s le divorce"). See generally Meulders-Klein, supra

note 25, at 299.
174. See generally Freed & Walker, supra note 24, at 413-18, 445-47 & 450 (typical

judicial and statutory guidelines for determining property distribution and support); cf.
Stark, supra note 47, at 1194 (urging explicit consideration of gender roles as well).
It has been observed that this adds uncertainty to an already unpredictable proceeding. See generally Ford, Rehabilitative Alimony: A Matter of Discretion or Direction?, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 285, 288 (1984); Note, Property Division and Alimony
Awards: A Survey of Statutory Limitations on JudicialDiscretion, 50 FORDHAM L. REV.
415 (1981).
175. Hyman, supra note 161, at 873.
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of their needs.' 76 Thus, judicial intervention should, in theory, address a major concern raised by negotiation. But it is unlikely that
77
increasing the court's role and authority improves the situation.
At least 39 states have task forces investigating the impact of gender
bias in the courts.' 78 All of the nine which have published reports
to date have found that "gender bias detrimental to women perme179
ates every aspect of marital dissolution and child support."
It is difficult to distill what West has called "women's gender
specific suffering" 80 from the endless details of a broken marriage.
A judge who is oblivious to the sex/gender system is unlikely to do
so. It is easier for a judge to remain oblivious if he is male. In this
psychologically loaded context, discretion permits the judge's own
bias, reflecting his own place in the patriarchy, to serve as the unexamined predicate for his decision.' 8 ' Divorce is governed not by
law, but quite literally by the men who comprise the vast majority
of family court judges in both countries. 8 2
176. West, supra note 10, at 37; cf.Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1945, 1954 (1988) ("what we want from
our judges is a special ability to listen with connection before engaging in the separation
that accompanies judgment").
177. See generally Freeman, Questioning the Delegalization Movement in Family
Law: Do We Really Want a Family Court?, in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLIcr, supra note 25, at 1, 15 (stressing the pertinence to family law of Max Weber's
observation that law intended to protect the weak must be "confined by rules").
178. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS (D. Knoebel & M. McCoy eds. 1990); Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida
and the Nation, 42 FL. L. REV. 181, 186 & n. 18 (1990).
179. Schafran, supra note 178, at 187.
180. West, supra note 142, at 84.
181. See Bartlett & Stack, supra note 10, at 25 & n.74 (discussing judicial bias in
custody determinations); Schafran, supra note 171, at 412. See generally supra note 86.
For a succinct history of the gender bias in the courts task force movement, see Schafran, supra note 178, at 183-86; see also Karlan, Towards the Elimination of Gender
Bias in the Florida Courts, 11 NOVA. L.J. 1569 (1987); Report of the New York Task
Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 15 (1986-87); Gender Bias
Study of the Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745 (1990); Gold,
Sex Bias is Found Pervading Courts, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1989, at 14, col. 1 (reporting
that women have "serious difficulty in obtaining legal assistance after divorce ...(and]
that alimony and child support payments were often inadequate" in Massachusetts, and
noting that these "findings are similar to those reported by studies in recent years in
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Maryland and Nevada").
For an excellent discussion of the specific problems of deciding custody, see
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 226 (Summer 1975).
182. See EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY, supra note 171; Johnston &
Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV.
675 (1977); Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?, Fourth Annual Barbara
Betcherman Memorial Lecture delivered by Mme. Justice Bertha Wilson, Supreme
Court of Canada (Feb. 8, 1990) [hereinafter Wilson Lecture]. Explicit guidelines would
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Female judges may make some difference if their experiences
enable them to understand and empathize with the needs of the women whom they judge. 8 3 Female judges, however, are a self-selected group. They have maneuvered-and acquired powerwithin a male dominated system and have necessarily assimilated
some of the values of that system in the process. They are con18 4
strained by the notions of judicial "objectivity" and "neutrality,"
(criticized by some commentators as a preemptive expression of the
dominant discourse) which may be understood as aspects of the in18 5
trapsychic constructs underlying the concept of judging itself.
B. Some Post Divorce Consequences of Intrapsychic Constructs
1. Custody Arrangements
The gendered intrapsychic constructs described above are reinforced and perpetuated where divorce leaves women with more parental responsibility, and men with less. Yet women passionately
87
oppose joint custody, 186 in practice as well as in theory, and men
probably be appreciated by some family court judges. In France, for example, one
spouse may be required "to compensate [the other], so far as possible, for the disparity
which the disruption of the marriage created in the conditions of their respective lives."
CODE CIVIL art. 1134 (Fr.). Absent specific directives, this seems to require an inordinately subjective determination on the part of the Court.
183. See Abramson, The Woman Has Robes: FourQuestions, 14 GOLDEN GATE L.
REV. 489 (1984); Resnik, supra note 10, at 1932-33 n.223; Sherry, The Gender of
Judges, 4 LAW & INEQUAL. 159 (1986); Wald, Disembodied Voices-An Appellate
Judge's Response, 66 TEX. L. REV. 623 (1988); Wald, The Role ofMorality in Judging:
A Woman Judge'sPerspective,4 LAW & INEQUAL. 3 (1986); Wilson Lecture, supra note
182, at 20-21; see also Kennedy, Distributiveand PaternalisticMotives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower,
41 MD. L. REV. 563, 587 (1982) ("Those who don't see [the decisionmaker] as 'one of
us' will suspect, the minute he begins to speak of distribution, that he is more of a player
than a referee, and those of his own group begin to worry that he will go over to the
enemy.").
184. See generally Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 237 (1987); Resnik, Feminism and the Language of Judging, 22 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 31 (1990).
185. Development of this theme is beyond the scope of this article, but would be
likely to require consideration of judge as father, high priest, and mediator. See generally R. SENNETr, AUTHORITY (1980); Curtis & Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE
L.J. 1727 (1987); supra notes 154-155.
For a comparative discussion of judicial roles in different countries, see M.
DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986).

186. By "joint custody", I mean shared decisionmaking authority, child-rearing responsibility and shared physical custody after divorce. Steinman, The Experience of
Children in a Joint-Custody Arrangement, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403 (1981)
excerpted in LOMBARD, supra note 114, at 148; see supra note 26.
187. See generally Albiston, Maccoby & Mnookin, Does Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 167 (1990).
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are usually threatened by it. This reflects the urgency and forcefulness of gendered intrapsychic constructs in this context. Is8 This is
hardly surprising, since it is through the custodial, intimate nurturing of children that gendered intrapsychic constructs replicate
themselves. The three constructs of "woman-as-mother" discussed
above; i.e., the private/public dichotomy, the dynamics of submission and domination, and the hostility of both sexes toward the "allpowerful mother"; are overwhelming in this context. These con-

structs have a profound influence on custody arrangements. 189
This explains, in part, our otherwise mysterious acceptance of
a post-divorce gender based division of labor. We all chafe from the
"straightjacket of gender."' 19 Feminists have exhaustively described the inequities of this division of labor during marriage,' 9'
but many women tolerate these inequities in order to keep the marriage together. As Levi-Strauss acutely observed, "The sexual division of labor is nothing else than a device to institute a reciprocal
188. See Z. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 74-75 (1988).
189. I agree with David Chambers that "[tihe movement to encourage joint physical
custody is wise but the movement to permit courts to impose joint custody is not."
Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 477, 479 (1984); Uviller, supra note 131, at 129 (courts are properly reluctant
to order joint custody against the wishes of either parent). The focus here is on the
reasons parents reject such arrangements.
190. D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 45.

191. See A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) (arguing that women suffer the consequences of a "stalled revolution" that propelled women into the marketplace but failed
to inspire men to assume commensurate responsibilities in the home); L. TILLY & J.W.
SCoTr, supra note 54, at 221 (describing "double burden of working wives" in France);
Koretz, Economic Trends, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 14 (citing economist June
O'Neil's work on the "sudden marked narrowing of the wage gap between women and
men." O'Neil predicts that "future progress will depend less on eliminating discrimination than on reducing persistent gender differences in the priorities placed on work and
family responsibilities); Cowan, Women's Gains on the Job: Not Without a Heavy Toll,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at A14, col. 5; see also Cowan, A Case Study of Technological and Social Change: The Washing Machine and the Working Wife, in CLIO'S CONSCIOUSNESS RAISED, supra note 3, at 245; Girard, Working Hoursand Time Schedules:
The Time Budget of Married Women in Urban Centers (France), in EMPLOYMENT OF
WOMEN, International Seminars 1968, No. 2, at 185-214 (Paris: OECD, 1970) (cited in
Cowan, supra, at 253 n.13); supra notes 106-111. It took enormous political effort, and
creative breakthroughs in employment law, for women to begin to enter previously sexsegregated workplaces. It is likely to require an even more radical transformation of the
family, and family law, before men assume their fair share of nurturing responsibilities
within the family. See Quinlen, Bears with Furniture, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at
A15, col. 5; Dionne, Struggle for Work and Family Fueling Women's Movement, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 22, 1989, at A18, col. 1; cf. Silver, supra note 3, at 81 (observing that in
France, "[the] lower the social class, the more likely men are to help in domestic
tasks").
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state of dependency between the sexes."' 192 As discussed above, the
woman assumes responsibility for keeping the home together and
193 But at dimaintaining connectedness among family members.
vorce, when the household divides, the justifications for this "reciprocal state of dependency" no longer exist.
Economic considerations alone cannot explain the woman's
post-divorce childcare responsibilities. Although the husband is almost invariably the higher wage-earner (even when the wife works
full time),' 94 his higher wages rarely benefit the family after divorce.
He is not abstaining from taking care of his children so that he can
earn more money for their support.' 95
An analysis based on intrapsychic constructs of "woman-asmother" suggests explanations for the post-divorce persistence of
the gender-based division of labor. First, women are concerned that
men cannot or will not take care of children properly, that is, as
women would. We expect women, in general, to be good at mothering. They usually have plenty of practice. Recognizing that their
world is gendered, little girls begin imitating their mothers and
other women early. They soon learn to place high values on "connectedness"' 96 and to practice interpersonal and nurturing skills in
197
interminable play with dolls.
Second, women resist ceding any of the limited territory where
9
their hegemony is generally acknowledged. 8 Nurturing children
192. C.

LEVI-STRAUSS,

THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP

347-48

(1969); cf. L. TILLY & J.W. ScoTT, supra note 54, at 53 (historically, the survival of the

family in France "depended on the work of both partners. The household division of
labor reflected the social definition of difference between husband and wife: tasks performed were complementary.... The family economy reproduced itself as the basic
economic unit of production.").
193. See supra text accompanying notes 108-112 & 136.
194. As many commentators have noted, the woman is doubly disadvantaged by the
gender-based division of labor. In the marketplace, she still earns approximately 68¢ to

her husband's $1.00. See Concoran, Duncan & Hill, The Economic Fortunesof Women
and Children: Lessons from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 10 SIGNS 232, 239
(1984) (noting that differences between women and men, such as education, work experience, work continuity, job restrictions, and absenteeism, "explain only about one-third
of the wage gap between white men and white women and only about one-quarter of the
wage gap between white men and black women"); supra note 105. At home, women
assume extra responsibilities, in part rationalized by their lower monetary contribution
to the household. See supra note 191. From a psycho-feminist perspective, we may all
prefer to believe that women do this work for "love." See generally A. OAKLEY, WOMAN'S WORK: THE HOUSEWIFE PAST AND PRESENT 7, 9 passim (1974).

195.
196.
197.
198.

L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5; see infra notes 228-229.
See Lyons, supra note 12; supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
C. GILLIGAN, supra note 136, at 24-63; Lyons, supra note 12.
B. HOOKS, supra note 102, at 139.
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is one area in which women's skills are recognized. Yet, despite
their expertise, mothers, and women in general, have had little input in creating enforceable standards for the post-divorce welfare of
their children. 199 They have had few options for assuring their children's safety and well-being other than sole physical custody. 2oo In
theory, it should not be difficult to generate acceptable alternatives.
If nurturing is truly learned behavior, for example, joint custody
could be conditioned upon ongoing "remedial" training for parents
20 1
with inadequate skills.
199. See Czapanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the Connections, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 619, 659 (1989) (suggesting a "dual parent/dual responsibility formula");
West, supra note 71, at 66. Criminal sanctions, rarely imposed in this context, may be
appropriate for negligent behavior. See also Harmer, Limiting Incarcerationfor Civil
Contempt in Child Custody Cases, 4 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 239 (1990); cf. Note, Making
ParentsBehave: The Conditioningof Child Support and Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1059, 1084 & nn.155-61 (1984) (noting selective effectiveness of jailing as a sanction for failure to comply with support orders; and concluding that the value of criminal
sanctions in this context is more in the threat than in the actual jailing. Id. at 1085 &
n. 164.). For an overview of issues raised by imposing limits on parental conduct, see J.
AREEN, supra note 24, at 462-72.
200. Goldstein, Freud & Solnit's classic, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, supports the proposition that it would be desirable for the custodial parent to have control
over the circumstances under which the child is raised. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

38 (1969). But see Dembitz,

Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1304, 1310-11 (1974).
201. Courses in nurturing are already a part of the curriculum in many public
schools. See, e.g., Wilson, Family Life Education: Needed Now More than Ever, N.Y.
Times, July 1, 1990, at 20, col. 1 (N.J. ed.) (21 states have compulsory family life and
sex education programs, focusing on interpersonal relationships, human growth development and sexuality, responsible personal behavior, and building strong families);
Schrenk, Grade-SchoolBabying, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1990, § 4a, at 19.
Like driver education, such courses could be made mandatory, if we decide that
handling children is as important and requires as much skill as handling cars. "You
can't legislate a parent to have a good relationship with a child," as David Liederman,
executive director of the Child Welfare League of America, has pointed out. Lewin,
Father's Vanishing Act Called Common Drama, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1990, at A18, ol.
1, col. 4. Where the parent yearns for and is working toward such a relationship, however, much can be done to facilitate it. There is a vast literature which could be tapped
to design workable programs for teaching fathers interpersonal nurturing skills. It has
been observed, for example, that adults do not respond like children do to "extrinsic"
motivators, such as grades. "Intrinsic" motivators, such as "the need for self-esteem"
or broadened responsibilites, are generally more effective. Knowles, Adult Learning, in
TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 168 (R. Craig 3d ed. 1989). See generally L. SEGAL, SLOW MOTION:
CHANGING MASCULINITIES, CHANGING MEN

(1990) (arguing that psycho-feminist

theories explaining male resistance to change are insufficient without an analysis of
class).
I am not suggesting that such programs could be easily implemented. Because of
the prevalence of child abuse, for example, men who want to take care of children are
more likely to be met with mistrust than support. Nordheimer, Caringfor Children,
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A major impediment here, of course, is the concern to maintain the privacy of the private sphere, translated into the "legal
tenet that the state should refrain from crossing the threshold of the
home of the functioning family, especially where the upbringing of
is women's
children [is] concerned. '20 2 Another significant factor
20 3
historically marginal role in the law making process.
But while social and political determinants cannot be ignored,
a focus on intrapsychic constructs of domination, submission and
hostility toward powerful women helps explain the failure of the
law to even consider alternatives to exclusive post-divorce female
parenting which address women's concerns for the welfare of their
children.
As discussed above, men (including family court judges and
especially ex-husbands) do not take orders from women. Just as
they achieved their masculinity by asserting their independence
from their mothers, they affirm it by demonstrating their independence from their wives. 2°4 When a father assumes custodial responsibility, he does so on his own terms. 20 5 From the mother's point of
view, this is too often to the child's detriment. 2°6 A distinct, but
related, reason for the failure to adopt feminine standards is that
20 7
such standards include an ethic of self-sacrifice that men reject.
Family court judges and even ex-husbands, for the most part, believe that a woman, especially a mother, can be counted on to put
the interests of the children above her own. 20 8
Men Find New Assumptions and Rules, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 1, A16,
col. 2.
202. M. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 1, at 291
(discussing French and United States family law).
203. For our purposes, this may be categorized as "public sphere" activity from
which women, for the most part, have been excluded. See supra text accompanying
notes 99-118.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 138-148.
205. See generally Grief, Fathers,Childrenand Joint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 311 (1979). When women enter the marketplace, in striking contrast, they are
held to a pre-existing (male) standard. In addition to the economic incentives for accepting that standard, it is consistent with an internalized construct of male domination.
This is one reason why the model developed by feminists in connection with employment discrimination cannot easily be applied in the family law context. See supra text
accompanying notes 77-84, 138-142.
206. See P. CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND
CUSTODY (1986).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 138-140. See generally Nelson, Mothering
Others' Children: The Experiences of Family Day-Care Providers, 15 SIGNS 586 (1990).
208. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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Although joint custody raises troubling questions for most of
it becomes increasingly appealing, 210 individually 211 and collectively, as gender roles become more fluid. We recognize the
problems associated with exclusive female parenting. It not only
puts women in a precarious financial situation, 2 12 but impedes the
development of an autonomous "subjective" self.2 13 For children,
sole female custody after divorce not only reinforces gender stereotypes and misogyny, 21 4 but results in often severe material deprivation, since they share in the "feminization of poverty. '2 15 For men,
it not only deprives them of a strong nurturing relationship with
their children, but their desire for a family 2 16 may lead them to incur financial obligations toward two or more households, 21 7 jeopardizing their own finances as well as the welfare of those dependent
on them.
us, 2° 9

209. The issue remains a divisive one for feminists. See Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 308 (1987); Post, Arguments

Against Joint Custody, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 316 (1989-90); Joint Custody Bill
Opposed by [NO. W.] State Board, NOW-NJ Newsbreaks, July 1989, at 3, col. 3
(N.O.W. State Board arguing that proposed joint custody bill would result in smaller
support awards for women and insurmountable implementation and enforcement
problems).
210. Joint custody is authorized in several states. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4600.5 (Deering 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. G36-6101 (1990); Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children FollowingDivorce, 12 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 523, 542-544 (1979). For a breakdown of custodial arrangements in
France, see STATISTIQUE ANNUELLE, supra note 1, at 282-83.
For cogent reviews of the literature, see Chambers, supra note 189, at 527-38;
Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial
and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 739, 741-42 (1983). See generally
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984);
Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64
TEX. L. REV. 687 (1985).
211. The gendered division of labor prevents us from becoming "intact self-created
human[s]." D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 272.
212. See supra note 194.
213. See supra notes 137-142. But cf Fineman, supra note 27, at 735 (objecting to
the critique of motherhood advanced by social workers and psychologists dealing with
custody issues).
214. See Shapiro, supra note 74, at 65 (discussing Yale study of families in which
fathers assume primary responsibility for child care and mothers work). Carolyn Heilbrun makes the provocative argument that since the gendered division of labor makes
"impossible the companionship of men and women," the survival of marriage as an
institution depends on its restructuring. C. HEILBRUN, supra note 3, at 189.
215. See supra note 45. For children in the United States, divorce is the strongest
single predictor of poverty. Concoran, Duncan & Hill, supra note 194, at 244.
216. See supra note 113 and text accompanying notes 124-126.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114.

r
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For society, exclusive post-divorce female parenting not only
218 but to the exclucontributes to the growth of a new underclass,
sion of nurturing values from a public sphere that desperately needs
them. Because of their assumption of devalued nurturing responsibilities, women lack the money, status, power, as well as the institutional or organizational support necessary for meaningful access to,
and participation in, the public sphere. Those for whom nurturing
values are most important have little opportunity to promote them
2 19 In short, we
in a political context, to our collective detriment.
have ample incentives to overcome our own ambivalence, our own
internalized ideas of gender, and begin to analyze and address the
intrapsychic constructs that underlie the post-divorce gendered division of labor.
2.

Enforcement of Support Awards

Compliance with the support provisions of divorce judgments,
which are almost invariably in favor of women and directed against
their higher-earning former husbands, is astonishingly low in both
France and America. 220 Why do otherwise law-abiding men disobey court orders requiring them to support their former wives and
1
this question 22
children? While a voluminous literature addresses
(with varying degrees of success), a psycho-feminist critique sug218. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 106, at 36-38; D. STETSON, supra note
children
32, at 99-100; L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 323. The penury of women and
may be more appropriately viewed as a persistent condition, rather than a new phenomenon. See L. TILLY & J.W. SCOTT, supra note 54, at 51-52.
D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 160-197; S. RUDDICK, MATERNAL
219.
THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1989) (taking care of small children develops capacities for creative, nonviolent conflict resolution sorely lacking in most (male)
64;
world leaders); Gordon, A National Care Agenda, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 1991, at
Jenson,
movements.
women's
for
theme
a
recurring
is
This
388.
at
99,
Held, supra note
supra note 1, at 70 (women's suffrage in France was expected to "inject social concerns
into a political process"); cf. D. GILMORE, MANHOOD IN THE MAKING: CULTURAL
aggressiveness and machCONCEPTS OF MASCULINITY IN THE MAKING (1990) (male
an anthropological point
from
useful,
self-destruction-were
of
point
the
to
ismo--even
of
of view, to preserve societies threatened by hostile invaders or scarcity; constructs
the
of
sake
the
for
self-sacrifice
of
values
reflect
womanhood,
of
those
like
manhood,
community).
220. M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY, supra note 1, at 276-79; D. STETDodSON, supra note 32, at 99-101; L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 262. See generally
for
Tools
New
1984:
of
Amendments
Enforcement
son & Horowitz, Child Support
Enforcement, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 50, at 3051 (Oct. 23, 1984).
by
221. See, e.g., D. CHAMBERS, supra note 114; Cox, Economic Support of Children
PATHE
in
Considerations,
Empirical
and
Theoretical
Some
Divorce:
Fathers Following
ed. 3d. ed. 1983);
RENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION 157, 164-68 (J. Cassetty
199.
note
supra
Note,
199;
note
supra
Czapanskiy,
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gests a shift in focus. Otherwise inexplicable behavior begins to
make sense when we take into account women's ongoing responsibility in the private sphere, the virtually universal resentment of
powerful women, and the gendered dynamics of dominance and
submission.
As discussed above, the mother is usually granted physical custody of the children while the father is granted visitation. Even if
he has cultivated close relationships with his children while he was
living with them, 222 it is hard for the father to sustain such relationships in his new capacity. 22 3 Since visitation is often difficult, awkward and even painful, 224 it is not surprising that the visits usually
taper off. 22 5 The father's role is unclear and men may be particu-

larly inept at dealing with the troubling ambiguities of the situation. 226 He is likely to blame his former wife for his problems with
the children since he holds her responsible for harmony in the domestic sphere. 227 Although the correlation between visitation and
support is problematic, 228 the less of a relationship a man has with
222. Intimacy between children and fathers is hardly facilitated by the intrapsychic
constructs described above. See supra text accompanying notes 96-148. While such
intimacy is not taken for granted, it may be established to the satisfaction of a court.
See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (unwed father's adoption veto may not
be precluded where substantial relationship with child has been established); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (as a matter of due process, unmarried father is entitled to
a hearing on fitness before children can be taken away).
223. Andre Dubus poignantly describes one father's dilemma in The Winter Father:
He saw that, in his eight years as a father, he had been attentive, respectful, amusing; he had taught and disciplined. But no: not now: when they
were too loud in the car or they fought, he held onto his anger, his heart
buffeted with it, and spoke calmly, as though to another man's children,
for he was afraid that if he scolded as he had before, the day would be
spoiled, they would not have the evening at home, the sleeping in the
same house, to heal them; and they might not want to go with him next
day or two nights from now or two days.
A. Dunus, SELECTED STORIES 27 (1988).
224. See, e.g., Wallerstein & Kelly, Effects of Divorce on the Visting Father-Child
Relationship, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1534, 1536-37 (1980). See generally Jacobs, The
Effect of Divorce on Fathers: An Overview of the Literature, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1235 (1982).
225. See Furstenberg & Harris, The Disappearing American Father? Divorce and
the Waning Significance of Biological Parenthood (Mar. 1990) (unpublished paper on
file with the author); Lewin, supra note 201.
226. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 136, at 39 passim; see also Wallerstein & Kelly, supra
note 224, at 1536. This is often complicated by geographic distance, remarriage or difficulty in arranging visitation with the former spouse. See Lewin, supra note 201, at A1S,
col. 2.
227. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 201, at A18, col. 5.
228. Mclsaac, Editorial- Joint Custody Retrospective, 26 CONCILIATION CT. REV.
iii, iv (June 1988). But see Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects of Ideology
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welfare
his children, the less concerned he is likely to be with their
229
support.
their
to
contribute
and the less likely he is to
The husband's reluctance to comply with his support obligations can be attributed, in part, to intrapsychic constructs of gender.
As a product of a mother-reared culture, he expects a woman to
provide psychological support, domestic harmony, and a refuge
from the marketplace. This is the quid pro quo for his financial
support. After divorce, he loses his privileged status in the domestic
hierarchy. Indeed, he may no longer have access to his former
home, or, if he does, only upon terms controlled by his former wife.
He feels completely justified in stopping payments from which he
no longer derives any benefit, especially since he not only has to pay
for his own housing, but must cope with the endless petty details of
housekeeping as well.
In this context, moreover, compliance with support obligations
represents submission to an all-powerful woman. As Dinnerstein
and others have observed, we are sympathetic to the plight of men
230 Popular culture is replete with
resisting the control of women.
23
images of alimony harpies pursuing hapless former husbands. '
The law consistently underestimates the extent of the former husband's resentment and fails to grapple with its consequences, especially in the United States. Finally, noncompliance with support
orders may afford the former husband his only remaining opportuand Mediation on Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States, 2
INT'L J. L. & FAM. 106 (1986). See generally Bartlett & Stack, supra note 10, at 35
n. 109; Chambers, supra note 189. Although courts chastise women for denying visitation when support payments are late, it is one of the most frequent forms of self-help.
See Note, supra note 199.
229. J. AREEN, supra note 24, at 676 (citing Cherlin & Furstenberg, Fathers Who
Don't Pay, Wash. Post, April 13, 1984, at A23, col. 1); D. CHAMBERS, supra note 114,
at 108-109; see Czapanskiy, supra note 199; Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345,
364-65 (1979); Comment, Child Support v. Rights to Visitation: Equity, Economics and
the Rights of the Child, 16 STETSON L. REV. 139 (1986). Andrea Remez has pointed
out that given the mother/wife equation, the father may resent the children as rivals. If
he did not seek the divorce-and woman-initiated divorce is increasingly common-he
may even blame them for taking the mother away from him. Telephone interview with
Dr. Andrea Remez (Apr. 12, 1990).
But see Bruch, supra note 228, at 109 (noting that "research results do not as yet
support claims [that joint custody enhances both paternal involvement and paternal
financial support]"); cf. Scott, supra note 21, at 34 n.76 (enforcement of child support is
difficult because 1) supporting parents cannot afford payments and/or 2) locating noncustodial parents and collecting payment presents special problems outside of jurisdiction where the support order was issued).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 119-121.
231. See, e.g., B. EHRENREICH, supra note 126, at 107, 159; WOMEN AS SINGLE
PARENTS, supra note 98, at 39.
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nity to dominate his former wife. He affirms his independence by
refusing to recognize his former wife as a person with needs of her
232
own, just as he refused to recognize his mother.
In both France and the United States it is the woman, rather
233
than the state, who initiates support enforcement proceedings.
Under French divorce law, unlike the American system, the state
assumes the role of guarantor, albeit to a limited degree. If support
is not paid under the French "maintenance advance" system, the
state provides the custodial mother with child support to a maximum amount set by law while simultaneously seeking to compel the
husband's compliance with the support order. 234 Compliance is
somewhat higher under this arrangement. Although its posture as
guarantor may spur the state to greater efforts against recalcitrant
husbands, the fact that it is the state that is seeking the payment not
only legitimates support but may weaken the husband's resistance
to it. Submission to the state is less psychologically loaded than
yielding to a former spouse.
In short, from the husband's point of view, he is being required
to keep up his end of the bargain (to provide financial support)
while his former wife is allowed to walk away from hers (to provide
emotional support and a comfortable home). This typically evokes
a response somewhere on a continuum between frustration and
rage, 235 and male judges are apt to be empathetic. 236 Withholding
support, or torturing the supported spouse with late or sporadic
payments, violates the law. It seems no worse to the husband, however, than the wife's legally condoned behavior, which violates
norms deeply rooted in intrapsychic constructs. These norms may
be ignored or even formally repudiated by the enforcement process,
232. D. CHAMBERS, supra note 114.
233. Cf. Freed & Walker, supra note 24, at 491-92 (table showing states which al-

low-but do not compel-wage assignments, income deductions, or direct payment to
court for support). An exception to this general rule in the U.S. would be the assign-

ment of her right to seek support to an agency by a mother receiving welfare.
234. M. GLENDON, supra note 21, at 89; cf. Moynihan, Another War-the One on
Poverty-Is Over, Too, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1990, at A15, col. I (interagency group
convened by White House considered, but rejected, national standards for child support, the 'gap between the minimum benefit and the amount paid by the absent father
(sic)' to be filled by government funding).
235. M. GLENDON, supra note 21, at 108.
236. See Schafran, Educating the JudiciaryAbout Gender Bias: The NationalJudicial Education Program to Promote Equalityfor Women and Men in the Courts and the
New Jersey Task Force on Women in the Courts, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 109, 114-15

(1986).
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but they remain deeply ingrained in the larger context of the sex/
gender system.
Despite the appearance of a range of alternatives, the end results of negotiation/mediation and adjudication are virtually indistinguishable. The smorgasbord of divorce options provided by
French law, like the myriad choices available in the fifty states, do
not alter the usual outcome because they do not address its underlying causes. In both countries, the dynamics of negotiation and the
tremendous latitude given typically male judges assure the de facto
perpetuation of male norms and the unspoken, unchallenged assumptions of patriarchy. Even where the law supports gender neutral results, direct state intervention at the enforcement stage is too
little, too late. The financial consequences of divorce remain devastating for women. From a psycho-feminist point of view, it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise.
CONCLUSION

We cannot begin to generate alternatives to the divorce and
post-divorce scenarios which I have described until we identify the
intrapsychic frameworks which underlie divorce. It has been the
purpose of this paper to begin that task. The collective process of
consciousness-raising, as Professors Katherine Bartlett and Elizabeth Schneider among others have astutely pointed out, is probably
the most effective method for exposing the profoundly gendered
premises of our culture. 237 Feminist family law scholars have already applied some of the insights gained through consciousnessraising, rigorously analyzing the ways in which family law incorpo238
rates assumptions about gender.
237. Bartlett, supra note 72; Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); see also J. MITCHELL, supra note 91, at 61 (describing consciousness raising as "transforming pain into
politics"); Klein, The Diffusion of Consciousness in the United States and Western Europe, in WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 23; cf. Colker, Feminism, Sexuality,
and Self- A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Politics of Authenticity (Book Review), 68
B.U.L. REv. 217, 245 (1988) (noting that "consciousness-raising itself may ... possibly
lead women away from, rather than toward, the discovery and expression of their authentic selves").
238. Ground-breaking examples include: Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98
YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Fineman, The Politics of Custody and the Transformation of
American Custody Decision-Making, 22 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 829 (1989); Kay, supra
note 35; Olsen, Family and Market, supra note 8; see also Bartlett, supra note 72, at 865
& nn. 156-157 (insights of feminist consciousness raising applied in "normative accounts of legal process and legal decision-making").
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We must bring consciousness-raising to the coulft room if we
are to continue to uncover the intrapsychic constructs of divorce.
Analysis has limited impact, however, unless it is expressed in a
social context and actually made part of the law structuring social

239
is an ambirelations. The feminist project to redefine family law

tious undertaking 24° and necessarily an incremental and dialectical
one.241 Divorce law is both a part and a function of the transformative process 242 through which our conceptions about social roles,
243 Change beincluding parenting roles, are already being altered.
comes possible when we recognize and articulate the ways in which
we unthinkingly conform to the precepts of a sex/gender system
that oppresses us all. 2 " Change becomes real when we apply these
divorce law. 245
insights in a social context and use them to reinvent
239. Fineman, supra note 27; Olsen, Myth of State Intervention, supra note 8; Scott,
supra note 21, at 10-11 & n.7; see also authors cited in supra note 238. Feminists who
are redefining the law in other contexts include: C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Estrich, Rape,
Law,
95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change:
Language and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990) (battered women); Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387 (1984); Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert
115;
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 195 (1986); Taub, supra note
West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment,
66;
42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990); REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s, supra note
Sexual Harassment Brief Bank and Bibliography, 8 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 267 (1985)
Cover, 96
(sexual harassment); see also Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
(1990).
51
REP.
L.
RTs.
WOMEN'S
12
YALE L.J. 1860 (1987); Stark, Book Review,
argue,
I
would
and
decisionmakers,
of
re-education
massive
require
well
may
It
240.
at dithe explicit incorporation of psycho-feminists' insights into the standards applied
Weitzman's
approval
with
(noting
n.155
&
310
at
209,
note
supra
Kay,
See
vorce.
proposal for judicial education and citing pending legislation that explicitly includes
note
"instruction on the effects of gender bias on family law proceedings"); Stark, supra
47 (urging matrimonial judges to consider the extent to which the parties conformed to
gender stereotypes during the marriage in dividing matrimonial property); Taub, supra
note 115 (suggesting that administrative tribunals consider stereotyping in determining
employment discrimination); Wiler, Identifying and Correcting Judicial Gender Bias,

in

EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY,

supra note 171, at 12.

241. Schneider, supra note 237. For a description of the ways in which litigation
itself may function as a form of consciousness-raising, see Bartlett, supra note 72, at
of
864-65 & n.144; Minow, supra note 4, at 16 (urging "struggles over descriptions
reality").
242. Olsen, supra note 10, at 3 ("Family law both reflects and helps create an ideology of the family-a structure of images and understandings of family life.").
243. See, e.g., J. STACEY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES: STORIES OF DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990).
244. Bartlett, supra note 72, at 876.
245. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 21, at 520 ("To overcome the pervasive weight
of traditional male and female roles we have to change the material conditions of men's
and women's lives, and the costs and benefits of custody for fathers and for mothers.");
West, supra note 10, at 71 ("Feminists must first and foremost counter a profound
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power imbalance, and the way to do that is through law and politics."); Luttrell, Book
Review, 15 SIGNs 635, 640 (1990) (discussing "the risky yet necessary step of advancing
feminist theory from a discursive to a political practice"). This is obviously a complicated process. Some major contemporary scholars who have attempted to describe it
are set forth in Bartlett & Stack, supra note 10, at 29 n.94.

